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RÉSUMÉ 
L'Infonuagique est un paradigme de système informatique distribué qui offre la possibilité 
aux usagers (clients) d’accéder à des services et ressources partagés hébergés chez des 
fournisseurs, afin de mieux répondre à leur besoin en matière de service et d’infrastructure 
informatiques. Dans l’environnement infonuagique, une même machine ou serveur physique peut 
héberger plusieurs machines virtuelles (VMs) qui sont partagées entre différents usagers ou 
clients, rendant ainsi transparent le partage des ressources matériels. 
De ce fait, l’Infonuagique crée un environnement propice à des cibles faciles, vulnérables 
et sujettes à des attaques accrues de pirates informatiques. A cause de la complexité des contrôles 
d’accès et de la difficulté à surveiller les interconnexions entre les différents systèmes, les 
applications et les données, l’on s’expose à de nouvelles opportunités. Il ne fait aucun doute que, 
en termes de sécurité, le plus grand défis auquel les fournisseurs et clients sont confrontés dans 
l’environnement Infonuagique multi-usager est le contrôle d’accès. 
La prévention des accès illicites et non autorisés aux ressources infonuagiques passe par 
un mécanisme de contrôle efficace des accès. D’un côté, les techniques de contrôle d’accès 
conçues originalement pour des systèmes locaux d’entreprise ne sont pas appropriées à 
l’Infonuagique et au système de colocation. D’un autre côté, un mécanisme de contrôle d’accès 
bien conçu ne devrait pas surcharger le système d’Infonuagique et devrait s’adapter avec facilité 
à l’infrastructure existante.  De nos jours, on se fie au VLAN et Coupe-feu par exemple pour 
assurer le contrôle d’accès dans l’environnement infonuagique. Ces techniques sont tout à fait 
efficaces mais des techniques complémentaires spécifiques à l’Infonuagique sont nécessaires 
pour prévenir les accès non autorisés aux ressources partagées dans le système distribué. 
Dans le cadre de ce projet de recherche nous proposons CloudGuard, un système qui 
implémente un mécanisme de contrôle d'accès basé sur un hyperviseur. Suivant le concept de 
sécurité en profondeur (security-in-depth), CloudGuard ajoute une couche complémentaire de 
sécurité aux environnements en colocation de l'infonuagique et prévient les accès non autorisés et 
illicites aux ressources infonuagiques. Cette architecture de sécurité peut être simplement 
appliquée à l'hyperviseur et fourni un contrôle d'accès évolutif et plus robuste que les techniques 
basées sur les réseaux existants.  
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ABSTRACT 
Cloud Computing is a distributed computing paradigm which allows the users to access 
the services and shared resources hosted by the various service providers, to meet their services 
or resources requirements. In a multi-tenancy cloud computing environment, multiple virtual 
machines (VMs) are collocated on the same physical server. In such system, physical resources 
are transparently shared by the VMs belonging to multiple users.  
Cloud computing also creates a suitable environment for easy targets, vulnerable and 
prone to sophisticated attacks. Also, due to the complexity of access and difficulty in monitoring 
all interconnection point between systems, applications and data sets, this can create new targets 
for intrusion. Undoubtedly, one of the most important security mechanisms in multi-tenancy 
cloud computing environment is access control.  
Implementing a proper access control mechanism can lead us to prevent unauthorized or 
illegal access to cloud resources. In one hand, most of current access control techniques were 
originally designed for enterprise environments that do not consider the characteristics of cloud 
computing and multi-tenancy environments. On the other hand, a well-designed access control 
mechanism should impose less possible overhead to the cloud computing system and it should 
easily leverage with the existing cloud infrastructure. Today, VLANs and firewalls are example 
of techniques that provide access control for cloud environments. These techniques are definitely 
effective but we need complimentary techniques that fit cloud computing and prevent 
unauthorized access to the resources in the distributed system.   
In this research project we propose CloudGuard, a system that implements a hypervisor-
based access control mechanism.  Based on the concept of security-in-depth, CloudGuard adds 
another layer of security to multi-tenancy cloud computing environments and prevents 
unauthorized and illegal access to the cloud resources. This security architecture can be simply 
implemented to hypervisor and provide scalable and more robust access control than existing 
network-based techniques.  
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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, a number of computing services, such as data storage and processing, email 
handling and web content management, are available instantly, commitment-free and on demand, 
using the concept of cloud computing [1]. Cloud computing is a flexible, cost-effective and 
proven delivery platform for providing business and consumer services over the Internet [2]. 
Such platform is shared and utilized by multiple customers who share computing resources, 
including CPU time, network bandwidth, data storage space, with other users, which refers to 
multi-tenancy [3]. By multi-tenancy, clouds provide simultaneous, secure hosting of services for 
various customers utilizing the same cloud infrastructure resources [4]. One customer can gain 
unauthorized access to the information of other customers. In this context, it is important to 
control the access of network entities to the information. This thesis investigates secure access 
control mechanisms in multi-tenancy cloud environments. This chapter provides the reader with 
an overview of the thesis and addresses the basic concepts, the problem definition, the objectives 
as well as the organization.   
1.1 Basic concepts 
This section offers an introduction to the basic concepts related to the problem definition 
and objectives. Firstly, a brief survey of cloud computing is presented. Later on, multi-tenancy in 
the context of virtualization is introduced as a technology and is explained in further details. 
Then, a sufficient concern will be given for the main aspects of security. Finally, access control 
will be explained. 
1.1.1 Cloud computing 
Since a huge amount of services is available online, the use of distributed systems namely 
cloud computing, is growing and is becoming more and more popular. Cloud computing is 
defined as a large scale distributed computing paradigm which has five key characteristics [5] 
[6]:  
• On-demand self-service: cloud is a large-scale pool of resources. Users need to buy the
services as they demand.
• Ubiquitous network access: a cloud is a group of virtualized devices, which enables users
!!
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to acquire the application service from any location. 
• Cost effectiveness: by switching from traditional network to cloud networks, companies
can reduce their costs. Because they do not need to buy the whole infrastructure, instead
they pay per use.
• Scalability: The size of cloud network can be scaled in a matter of few clicks, because
users can add computing computer resources and scale their network easily just by
demanding the cloud provider.
• High commonality: cloud computing is not aimed at specific applications. Different
applications can utilize the same cloud resources.
To analyze and describe cloud-based systems, many people refer to cloud solutions in terms 
of its deployment model and services model. These two terms originated from the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [7] [8]. Cloud infrastructure may be operated in 
one of the following deployment models: public cloud, private cloud, community cloud and 
hybrid cloud. 
• Public cloud: the computing resources are made available to the general public over a
public network. In this context public cloud may be owned, managed, and operated by a
business, academic, or government organization or some combination of them. With
public cloud services, users do not need to purchase hardware, software or supporting
infrastructure, which is owned and managed by providers [9]. (Figure 1-1)
!!
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Figure 1-1 Public cloud 
• Private cloud: the exclusive access to and usage of the infrastructure and computational
resources is given to a single cloud consumer’s organization. In this context a private
cloud may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third party, or some
combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises [8]. Private clouds have some
key characteristics such as: highly automated management of resource pools,
sophisticated security and self-service interface that helps IT staff to allocate IT resources
very quickly [9]. (Figure 1-2)
Figure 1-2 Private cloud 
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• Community cloud: serves a group of cloud consumers which have shared concerns such
as mission objectives, security, privacy and compliance policy, rather than serving a
single organization, as does a private cloud. It may be owned, managed, and operated by
one or more of the organizations in the community, a third party, or some combination of
them, and it may exist on or off premises. (Figure 1-3)
Figure 1-3 Community cloud 
• Hybrid cloud: is a combination of two or more clouds (private, community or public) that
remain as distinct entities but are bound together by standardized or proprietary
technology that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load
balancing between clouds. (Figure 1-4)
Figure 1-4 Hybrid cloud 
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Moreover cloud computing provides many service resources over the Internet. These resource 
services can be readily broken down into one of three Service Models as defined by NIST [7] [8] 
and known as the SPI (Software, Platform and Infrastructure) model. (Figure 1-5) 
Software as a Service (SaaS): In this service model, the consumer uses the provided 
applications and do not manage or control the network, servers, storage and the applications. 
Examples of SaaS are: Flickr, Google Docs, Siri, Amazon and Cloud Drive [10]. 
Platform as a Service (PaaS): This solution provides a collection of hardware and 
software resources that developers use to build and deploy cloud-based applications. PaaS 
solutions run a Windows- or a Linux-based operating system and normally support a specific 
programming environment, such as .NET or Java. [11]. The examples of PaaS are: Google App 
Engine, Amazon Web Services. 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): In the infrastructure as a service, the consumer gets 
access to the infrastructure in order to deploy their applications and systems, but they do not 
manage or control the infrastructure and they control the storage and applications. Examples of 
IaaS are: Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [10]. 
Figure 1-5 Cloud deployment model [9] 
1.1.2 Virtualization 
Virtualization is an indispensible part of cloud computing. It brings scalability to the 
cloud computing. By virtualization, the sufficient amount of computing power allocates to the 
client needs. But if the needs grow, more computing power can be allocated to that client [12]. 
Virtualization is an extremely powerful tool to grow the scalability. In other words, virtualization 
consists of creating a virtual version of resources, such as a server, storage device, network or 
!!
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even an operating system. Li Yunfa et al. (2010) [13] states that “ by using the virtual technology, 
the computer system can aggregate all kinds of data resources, software resources and hardware 
resources and make there resources to provide service for different tasks”. Virtualization 
technology acts as the core concept of cloud computing. Thus, we should pay special attention in 
the architecture and security of virtualization when researching about cloud computing security.  
Hypervisor also called Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) is one of the key components of 
virtualization and support the running of multiple Operating Systems (OSs) concurrently on a 
single host computer. The main responsibility of Hypervisor is to managing the application’s OSs 
that is called the guest OSs and their use of the system resources (e.g., CPU, memory and 
storage). Figure 1-6 shows the architecture of a virtual machine system in which multiple virtual 
machines (VMs) share the same “physical machine”, or host. Above the hardware layer, the 
hypervisor provides resource allocation to virtual machines [13]. 
VM 1 VM 2 VM i VM n 
Guest OS Guest OS Guest OS Guest OS 
Host OS/VMM 
Hardware 
Figure 1-6 Architecture of virtual machine system [13] 
Multi-tenancy in virtual machines is another important attribute of cloud computing. 
Multi-tenancy is a technology by which several VMs are runnable in a physical server. In a multi-
tenancy environment, multiple customers share the same application, running on the same 
operating system, on the same hardware, with the same data-storage mechanism. In other words, 
different users are assigned different VMs that are running on a same physical hardware. Multi-
tenancy has several advantages such as effectiveness in the resource sharing and also prioritizing 
users based on their needs. Multi-tenancy in VMs can be considered as a hierarchical model, 
where appropriate policies are enforced on the VMs at every level leading to better governance 
and segmentation of the consumers [14]. 
!!
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1.1.3 Security 
Security in cloud computing as defined by [10] refers to a broad set of policies, 
technologies, and controls deployed to protect data, applications, and the associated infrastructure 
of cloud computing. More specifically, cloud computing security refers to three aspects as 
illustrated in Figure 1-7: confidentiality, integrity and availability [15].  
Figure 1-7 Aspects of security 
Confidentiality refers to the fact that only authorized parties have access to computer-
related assets. Having access here means reading, printing, or even knowing that a particular asset 
exists [15]. Confidentiality becomes very important if the cloud system is dealing with sensitive 
data. Therefore, maintaining maximum level of data confidentiality in the cloud is a fundamental 
requirement, which will attract even more users consequently. Basically, for dealing with this 
challenge in the cloud systems there are two traditional approaches: physical isolation and 
cryptography [3].  
Integrity in a cloud means that data should not be lost or modified by unauthorized 
users[3]. In the context of data security, it means that only authorized parties should be able to 
modify the assets. Here, modification means writing, changing, deleting and creating [15]. In 
most of the cases, the confidentiality and integrity are used interchangeably, because if the 
confidentiality of data is guaranteed in a cloud system, we can be sure that the integrity is also 
maintained.  
Availability in the context of cloud computing means that assets are accessible to 
authorized parties at the appropriate time. Nowadays, we can see many cloud environments in 
Con%identiality!
Availability!Integrity!
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which availability is very important. For example, we can name YouTube and Netflix, which 
offer multimedia to their customers and for which the availability of information is essential [15]. 
1.1.4 Access control 
Access control is a security feature that controls how users and systems communicate and 
interact with other systems and resources [16]. Information and resources should be accessed in a 
way so they can be protected from unauthorized modification or disclosure. Generally, there are 
three types of controls that enforce access control [16]: 
• Physical controls
Implementation of security measures in a defined structure in order to prevent
unauthorized access to sensitive material. Examples of physical controls are: security
guards, picture IDs, locked and dead-bolted steel doors, biometrics, closed-circuit
surveillance cameras and motion or thermal alarm systems.
• Technical controls
Technical controls employ technology as a basis for controlling the access to sensitive
data throughout a physical structure and over a network. Examples of technical controls
are: encryption, smart cards, network authentication, access control lists (ACLs) and file
integrity auditing software.
• Administrative controls
Administrative controls define the human factors of security. All levels of the personnel
within an organization are involved in administrative controls. Administrative controls
also determine which users have access to what resources and information by the use of:
training and awareness, disaster preparedness and recovery plans, personnel recruitment
and separation strategies and personnel registration and accounting.
The above-mentioned control types can be integrated into cloud computing security 
architectures in order to preserve the integrity, confidentiality and availability of resources that 
are collocated in multi-tenancy cloud environment. In this research we investigate the use of 
technical controls for controlling the access to sensitive information in a multi-tenancy cloud.  
!!
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1.2 Problem definition 
In a multi-tenancy cloud network, many clients may collocate in one or more hosts. In this 
context, each client may have one or more VMs. Thus, one physical server can host few VMs. In 
such an environment, one client can send unlimited amount of traffic to another client. 
Accordingly, a malicious agent can rent a VM on the same host where the target VM resides. 
This malicious agent can send unauthorized traffic to target VM and violate the security of the 
target VM.  
The unauthorized traffic may contain some script or malware which violate the 
confidentiality or integrity of the target VM’s data. Even if the traffic does not contain any script 
or malware, by keep sending numerous amount of simple traffic (e.g., Internet Control Message 
Protocol ICMP packets) a malicious agent can perform ping-to-death attack. This attack can 
violate the availability of data.  
Sending unauthorized traffic to another VM makes it possible to perform other sort of 
attack. For instance, the malicious agent that own a VM can perform VM Hopping over another 
user that is co-located on the same host [17, 18]. With VM hopping, an attacker has control of 
one virtual machine and tries to gain control of another. VM hopping allows attacker to move 
from one virtual server to the next or even gain root access to physical hardware [19]. VM 
hopping is a considerable threat because several VMs can run on the same host making them all 
targets for the attacker. By performing this attack a malicious user can violate the security and 
steal the data of the other users that are located on the same server by compromising hypervisor 
file system [14].  
Beside that, the malicious insider can perform DoS (Denial of Service). This attack 
exhausts the resources of the cloud network such as bandwidth and computing power by sending 
large amount of unauthorized traffic to another VMs. 
1.3 Objectives 
Our main objective in this research is to design secure access control architecture for multi-
tenancy cloud environments. In order to reach the main objective, we pursuit the following goals: 
1. To study and to analyze existing methods of controlling access in the multi-tenancy cloud
environments.
!!
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2. To propose a secure access control architecture to prevent malicious insiders from
generating and sending unauthorized traffic to another VMs in the multi-tenancy cloud
network.
3. To evaluate the performance of the proposed architecture and prove that it can overcome
the problem using mathematical modeling.
1.4 Organization of the thesis 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. The rest of this dissertation is organized as 
following: Chapter II presents the state of the art of the access control models in the virtualized 
environments and, more especially, in the multi-tenancy cloud networks. Chapters three and four 
present information relative to experiments conducted for this project. In chapter III the proposed 
architecture is exposed in details. Chapter IV is devoted to the validation and performance 
analysis of the proposed architecture. Finally, we conduct the conclusion and the future works. 
11
CHAPTER 2 STATE OF THE ART 
This chapter provides the state of the art of existing security architectures for controlling 
access in multi-tenancy cloud environments. First of all we describe multi-tenancy in detail. Then 
we will explain the problems and issues in the multi-tenancy environments. Third section is 
dedicated to security requirements. After that we study the access control methods in the cloud 
computing. Finally, problems and challenges of the existing multi-tenancy cloud security 
solutions will be discussed.  
2.1 Multi-tenancy 
Multi-tenancy is the core technology of cloud computing [20] . It means the use of the same 
resources by multiple consumers; these consumers may belong to the same organization or to 
different organizations. The best way to think about multi-tenancy environment is to see each 
client or user of cloud as the tenant of that cloud. Both cloud service providers (CSP) and 
legislative bodies need to acknowledge the impacts that multi-tenancy can have on user privacy. 
 Guo et al. (2007) believe that multi-tenancy technology is one of the key competencies for 
network delivery services to achieve higher profit margin by leveraging the economics of scale 
[4]. This model, enables many users, data and resources to be located in the same computing 
cloud, and these data and resources are controlled and distinguished through the use of tagging 
for the unique identification of resource owned by individual users [20].  Multi-tenancy in cloud 
service models implies a need for the following concepts [21]: 
• Policy-driven enforcement is an approach for enforcing the security policies. In this
approach, the security policies and access controls are implemented in a way that can be
managed and handled effectively.
• Segmentation is used to ensure sensitive back-end services are well protected from the
(potentially vulnerable) publically available front-end. This segmentation can be
accomplished by implementing a hypervisor firewall.
• Isolation means that, virtual machines that belong to a tenant should be isolated from
other tenants. This can be achieved by hosting virtual machines of tenant in different
physical servers or by using VLAN.
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• Governance enables cloud users to  customize and tailor software and hardware according
to their needs to fit with their specific needs. User in a multi-tenancy cloud environment
should be able to easily manage and configure their virtual machines.
• Service levels measure the quality of service that a service provider is supposed to
provide to clients. In the context of multi-tenancy cloud computing, the service provider
agrees to provide certain type of computing services according to the service levels and
contact that was signed between them and cloud users.
• Charge-back/billing models define different billing models for different consumer
constituencies. Pay-per-use is one of the characteristics of the cloud computing and by
that, cloud users can reduce their costs. Also for cloud providers, in order to make full use
of economic scale of cloud computing, the services are usually hosted following a multi-
tenancy model [22].
As illustrated in Figure 2-1, a multi-tenant cloud service provider has three essential elements: the 
cloud manager, the hypervisor and the virtual machines [21]. Cloud manager is a console of 
management provided for clients in order to manage their cloud infrastructure. Here managing 
means creating, shutting down, or starting the instances. The hypervisor, also called virtual 
machine manager (VMM), allows multiple operating systems (guests or virtual machines) to run 
concurrently on a host server. Its role is to control the host processor and resources, and also to 
allocate what is needed to each operating system and. Another role of hypervisor is to prevent 
VMs from using resourcing more than the amount that was allocated to them.  A virtual machine 
is an isolated guest operating system installation within a normal host operating system. 
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Figure 2-1 A simple model for a multi-tenant cloud service provider [21] 
Multi-tenancy architecture for SaaS 
To understand multi-tenancy in SaaS cloud computing service model, let us focus on the high 
level multi-tenancy architecture proposed by Chang et al. [23]. Such architecture has three 
attributes: 
• Scalable
In this context scalability means the ability to maximize the concurrency of the resources,
as well as the ability to use applications more efficiently.
• Multi-tenant-efficient
Multi-tenancy should have the ability to maximize resource sharing across tenants and to
be able to differentiate data belonging to different tenants.
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• Configurable
The ability of configuring applications easily by tenants, without incurring extra
development or operation costs for each configuration.
Broadly speaking, multi-tenancy in SaaS cloud application maturity can be expressed
using a model with four distinct levels [Figure 2-2]. The term maturity in this context relates to 
the degree of formality and optimization of processes, from ad hoc practices, to formally defined 
steps, to managed result metrics, to active optimization of the processes. Each level is 
distinguished from the previous one by the addition of one of the three attributes listed above. 
Figure 2-2 Four level SaaS multi-tenancy cloud [23] 
• Level I: ad hoc/custom
This level of maturity is similar to the traditional application service provider model of 
software deliver in 1990s. At this level, each customer has its own customized version of the 
hosted applications. As well as running its own instance of the application on the host’s servers. 
• Level II: configurable
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At this level of maturity, the vendor hosts an isolate instance of the application for each 
tenant. Here the cloud provider should provide sufficient hardware and storage to support a 
potentially large number of application instances running concurrently. 
• Level III: configurable, multi-tenant-efficient
At this level of maturity, the vendor runs a single instance that serves every customer. 
Authorization and security policies ensure that each customer's data is kept separate from that of 
other customers; and, from the end user's perspective, there is no indication that the application 
instance is being shared among multiple tenants. Main disadvantage of this level is that it is not 
scalable. But this approach eliminates the need to provide server space for each instance of each 
tenant.  
• Level IV: scalable, configurable, and multi-tenant-efficient
At this level of maturity, the vendor hosts multiple tenants on a load-balanced farm of 
identical instances, with each tenant’s data kept isolated.  A SaaS system is scalable to an 
arbitrarily large number of customers, because the number of servers and instances on the back 
end can be increased or decreased as necessary to match demand, without requiring additional re-
architecting of the application, and changes or fixes can be rolled out to thousands of tenants as 
easily as a single tenant. 
Choosing a maturity level of multi-tenancy for applications depends on many items, such as 
business model, architectural model, operational needs and customer considerations  [23].  
2.2 Security issues in multi-tenancy environments 
In a multi-tenancy cloud network, if a security breach occurs, it can result in the exposure 
of data to other possibly competitive tenants [24]. According to this fact, more attention should 
be paid to the security of tenant in this cloud environment.  For example, if we agree that 
scalability is one of the key features of cloud computing therefore, matters like scalability and 
security must be taken into consideration before designing and deploying a multi-tenant 
environment. In multi-tenancy environments, even the impact of hardware and software failure 
will also have a much larger impact than that of occurring on a single-tenancy environment [20]. 
An important impact of multi-tenancy is that the data or trace of operation of a tenant may be 
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visible (availability) and accessible (integrity and confidentiality) by another tenants [21]. In this 
context, when the data is visible and accessible by other tenants, it means that the confidentiality 
and availability of the data is not preserved.  
Chow et al. [25] categorized security concerns of the multi-tenancy cloud computing as 
follows: 
• Traditional security concerns means that the network attacks can be committed easier on a 
cloud network than a traditional network. Among this category we can find different 
classes of attacks including VM-level attacks. In other words, VM-level attacks exploit 
potential vulnerabilities in the hypervisor. VM technologies used by cloud vendors are a 
potential problem in multi-tenant architectures. Vulnerabilities have appeared in VMware, 
Xen, and Microsoft’s Virtual PC and Virtual Server [26]. 
• Availability concerns prevent companies from switching their traditional networks to the 
cloud. The stack holders want their network and services to be available all the time. In a 
virtual environment the same concern exists and the tenants want the services and 
resources to be available for them in proper time. These concerns center on critical 
applications and data being available.  
• Third-party data control concerns. The legal implications of data and applications being 
held by a third party are complex and not well understood. In fact, there are some 
audibility concerns which means, auditing the activities and interaction of the tenants. It 
seems that there is not sufficient transparency in the operations of the cloud provider for 
auditing purposes. Currently, this transparency is provided by documentation and manual 
audits. In march 2009, the information security magazine asks a question that attracts 
many attentions [27]: “How do you perform an on-site audit for example, when you have 
a distributed and dynamic multi-tenant computing environment spread all over the globe? 
It may be very difficult to satisfy auditors that your data is properly isolated and cannot be 
viewed by other customers.”  
In addition to previous concerns, Tianfield et al [28] mentioned reusability as an important 
concern in cloud computing environments. So, reusable infrastructures must be carefully 
investigated and controlled because they can create a serious vulnerability. Confidentiality and 
integrity of information could be breached unintentionally, due to data remanence. Data 
!!
17 
remanence is the process of residual representation of data that have been in some way nominally 
deleted or removed. Data remanence could cause unwilling disclosure of private data due to 
virtual separation of logical drives and lack of hardware separation between tenants on a single 
infrastructure. Also, malicious agents may claim a large amount of disk space and perform 
scavenging for sensitive data [28]. 
2.3 Security methods in cloud environments 
In previous section we reviewed security issues in multi-tenancy cloud environments. In 
this section we are going to study general methods of security in the cloud computing. The reason 
for dedicating one section for security methods in general in the context of cloud computing is 
that, is most of the cases we have overlap in different areas of security in cloud.  
Privacy of Information in multi-tenancy  
K.Wood and M.Anderson (2011) proposed two main solutions for solving the privacy 
(confidentiality) of information in the multi-tenancy environments [20]. First of all they consider 
lack of standardized regulations and legislation as a major problem in the field of cloud 
computing especially in the adoption of multi-tenant systems. The existing European Union (EU) 
and United States (US) legislations are more specific sector (such as HIPAA for health agencies 
in the US and SOX Act for financial institutions) on privacy being enforced rather that one 
consistent privacy agreement being made [29]. Secondly, they name Encryption as a potential 
solution for confidentiality of information in multi-tenancy environments. Whilst cryptography 
techniques are appropriate for conserving and protecting users data inside a cloud, there are two 
drawbacks related to the use of encryption. The first issue arises when the data of all users that 
are stored in a cloud are encrypted with the same algorithm and this can diminish the confidence 
of end user about the CSP. The second issue is the fact that basically, the data should be 
decrypted to plaintext in order to be readable and the process of data decryption can open new 
doors for malicious agents to intercept processing jobs to access the data. In recent years to new 
encryption techniques called Predicate Encryption and Homomorphic Encryption have emerged 
as possible solutions to reduce some of the so-called challenges and concerns of using multi-
tenancy environments. Predicate encryption as a new encryption paradigm that provides the 
master secret key owner with a fine-grained control over access to encrypted data [30]. 
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Homomorphic encryption, on the other hand, has a mechanism that enables us to process the 
cipher text, in this case we do not need to decrypt data prior to processing [29].  
Multi-Tenancy Authorization System 
Jose M. Alcaraz et al. (2010) tried to improve the security of multi-tenancy cloud systems 
by defining a new Authorization model. So, they proposed a multi-tenancy authorization model 
that suite middleware service in the PaaS layer [31]. This authorization system provides access 
control to the information and services of all the different cloud services using the cloud 
infrastructure. When authorization model is created in order to control the access to resources in a 
cloud system, this authorization model can interpret 5-tuple (Issuer, Subject, Privilege, Interface, 
Object) in the following way: the Issuer says that the Subject has the Privilege to perform a give 
action the Object associated to the Interface type, for example (Jose, role(Nige,Admin), Read, 
CloudStorage, \root\).    
 
Figure 2-3 Example of an authorization system in a multi-tenancy scenario [31]. 
Figure 2-3 shows a cloud computing scenario with multi-tenancy authorization system in 
which, three different businesses exist and each one has two different cloud services. In this 
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example, the authorization system can interpret the 5-tuple (IssuerA, Role(IssuerB, rusers), Read, 
ServiceA.1, \root\). In this case IssuerA grants anybody with role(IssuerB, users) Read access to 
the \root\ folder of the file system provided by ServiceA.1.  Also role(IssuerB, users) is controlled 
by IssuerB. According to this model, different issuers use this model to define the authorization 
information in the system. When there is an authorization request, the system uses all the 
authorization information to determine if a request is authorized. If it cannot prove the 
authorization by using the tuple-5, then a “deny by default’ is applied, rejecting access to the 
resource.  
Currently, tenant isolation is a way of securing multi-tenancy environments [32, 33]. 
Although this isolation should be guaranteed but within a multi-tenant framework, there exist 
always a risk that the isolation of the tenant is compromised due to a malfunctioning component 
or architectural weakness or an inadvertent programming error. When an organization is 
registered as a tenant of a cloud system, it should be able to manage/administer its own users, 
data and services, but this organization should not be able to administrate functionality of the 
overall application such as shutdown and viewing system logs [34]. 
Virtualization security 
Dimitri Mckay a security architect at LogLogic Inc., in a published video [33] describes 
vulnerabilities and security methods in virtualized network environments. As per him, 
virtualization is the backbone of cloud computing and this virtualization is performed by 
hypervisor and he describes security challenges in the virtualized networks as below:  
• Hyperjacking   
• VM-hopping  
• VM-theft 
Currently, the techniques that exist in order to secure these environments are all traditional 
security. Basically all these vulnerabilities are coming from hypervisors. In hyperjacking for 
example when the hypervisor is owned, then the attacker has the ability to steal VMs themselves, 
the ability to use them as a staging ground to attack other virtual machines and those quest 
operation systems. Also they can use it as a way of maintaining the persistence. So, when hacker 
gets the access, they want persistence, they want the ability to come back at any time.   
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In two other challenges like VM-Hopping and VM-Theft, the flat network plays a vital role. If 
you think of the way that virtual environments are now flat networks in which they lack intrusion 
detection system (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS) without routing data through these 
tools, without log management tools, and actually the networks has become very flat because of 
these virtualized networks. The networking components that exist in the traditional networks do 
not exist in the current cloud infrastructures. So, although we think cloud computing is being a 
new thing, the same concept exists between what was traditional security and what is security. If 
we consider that cloud is a simple network, one machine can be staging ground to attack high 
value targets. The challenge here is that if the hacker can compromise a low priority target like an 
ftp server and using that as a staging ground to attack where the real data lives.  
At the end, he focus on the traditional security and propose some solutions for the so 
called challenges such as, segregating the networks, running the traffic through the IPS and IDS, 
segregating the virtual networks into different pieces, making sure the traditional routes that 
people do for traditional networks still applies, making sure that the operating systems are 
patched, making sure the software solutions in customer side are patched, and most important 
point is to secure the hypervisor like hypervisor console.    
Virtual machine migration 
Brian Hay et al. (2012) addressed VM Migration as a point of vulnerability in IaaS model of 
multi-tenancy cloud environment [35].  The ability to move VMs between physical hosts is vital 
in order to perform load balancing and also facilitating high availability operations. Other 
considerations that make such migration appealing are as bellow: 
• Ability to use physical hardware efficiently to meet consumer demand. For example, 
consider the simple case of a CP that offers consumer the option to deploy small (25% of 
a physical server) or large (50% of a physical server) VMs. If they have three physical 
servers with 3 small VMs each, they cannot deploy a large VM despite there being 75% 
of a physical server available in the resource pool. Migration of small VMs would allow 
the same physical resources to be meet the demand.  
• Ability to migrate VMs to alternative geographical locations. This migration prepares 
VMs for recovery, also to provide better network performance as user demographics 
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change, or even to place the VM in a legal jurisdiction more compatible with the activities 
being performed.  
• Ability to organize and segregate VMs in order to prevent conflicts, such as when VMs 
assigned to tow competing corporations are assigned to the same physical host.   
Brian Hay et al. in their research, they explore the analogy between human migration in the 
real world and virtual machine migration in an IaaS cloud environment. So, based on an 
examination of these analogous real-world scenarios and their applicability to the cloud, they 
addressed following issues and solutions:  
1. Jurisdictional control 
To overcome the jurisdictional control issue, Brian Hay proposed restricting the migration 
of VMs to those zones that meet the requirements, and vice versa, a more fluid transfer of 
VMs through the cloud can be achieved while complying with jurisdictional regulations.   
2. Zone evolution 
In order to meet the ever-changing needs of the cloud, new servers and resources may be 
added to cloud zones. Knowledge of characteristics of and requirements of the VMs in the 
cloud help us for better utilization of cloud resources given the dynamic environment also 
it can help us to identify whenever a VM in a zone would be better suited elsewhere or 
when the VM is no longer in compliance with its current zone.  
3. Migration 
The process of VM migration like human migration may have different motivational 
factors. In this migration process, at least two zones are involved, source zone A and 
destination zone B.  Stakeholders of the zones, just like border patrol have the dual goals 
of ensuring that both entering and departing VMs comply with restriction on their 
movement.  These Emigration Agent guards are responsible for determining if an exiting 
VM (in case of having SECRET data) meets the requirements for leaving a zone. Just like 
an immigration perspective, immigration agents (like Border Patrol) should be able to 
ensure that VMs moving into a new zone meet the migration requirements of that zone.  
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Figure 2-4 Migration path between two zones [35] 
4. Resource Instantiation 
Instantiation of a new resource is like migration of VM and all approaches in the 
migration can be applied to instantiation. So, a new VM can be considered as a special 
migration case that is coming from a “null zone”. 
 
2.4 Security requirements 
I.Iankoulova et al. [36] used a security model to analyze and classify the security 
requirements in cloud computing. This security model consists of nine sub-factors that identify 
different aspects of system security. In this section we mention six important security 
requirements that match our research as bellow: 
 
Figure 2-5 Taxonomy of cloud security requirements 
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I. Access control 
In this degree, the system limits the access to tis resources only to authorized parties 
(e.g., human users, programs, processes and devices). So, this security requirement, 
address the need to recognize entities that want to interact with the system. Access 
control also needs to make sure that the parties exactly who they say they are and 
giving them access only to the resources that they are allowed to access. In order to set 
the access control requirements, the following items should be taken into 
consideration: 
1. Method of access to the cloud 
Web applications are usually used in order to provide access to the cloud 
service user (CSU).  Unfortunately, due to authentication protocols problems, 
current web applications are deemed the weakest point of cloud computing 
[37]. 
2. Architecture of the cloud 
Virtual machines instance interconnectivity is the biggest challenge in the 
architecture of the cloud computing. Also a key concern in virtualization is 
isolation [38], this isolation guarantees that one tenant cannot affect another 
tenant what is running in the same host.  
3. Features of the multi-tenant environment  
In a multi-tenant environment some problems can be cause such as role name 
conflicts, cross-level management and composition of tenants’ access control. 
So, the security requirements should be aligned to specific context of the 
multi-tenancy in order to avoid the so-called problems.  
II. Attack/harm detection 
This security requirement refers to the detection, recording, and notification 
requirements when an attack is attempted and/or succeeds.  
III. Integrity  
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Integrity is the fact that how well various components of cloud environment are 
protected from intentional and unauthorized corruption.  
IV. Security auditing 
For this security requirement, security personnel should be enabled to audit the status 
and use of security mechanisms by analyzing security related events [39]. Security 
auditing is usually done by in order to achieve compliance to laws and regulations or 
also for the sake of accountability and control. 
V. Privacy and confidentiality 
Privacy as explain before in the first chapter is all about preventing unauthorized 
parties from obtaining sensitive data and information.   
VI. Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation is about preventing a party to an interaction with the cloud to deny 
the interaction.  
Observation to the above security requirements in the cloud computing environments 
shows that most of the times, some requirements are tightly interconnected. For example, access 
control and non-repudiation are closely interconnected. Also attack detection requirements are 
strongly connected to integrity because once being able to identify an attack the step is to stop it 
from harming the integrity and sometimes the two steps are not separated. 
 
2.5 Cloud access control methods 
In cloud computing environments, various entities may appeal to join the cloud and a cloud 
system consists of large number of entities, such as user and resources. Access Controls are 
security features that can control how users and systems communicate and interact with other 
systems and resources [16]. These security features can be implemented into a cloud system in 
the form of technical, physical or administrative. Access is the gateway that leads to critical 
assets, due to this fact, access is the most exploited aspect of the security [16]. In order to be 
more effective, access control should be applied in a layered defense-in-depth method.  
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2.5.1 Principals 
In the field of information security, access is the flow of information between a subject and 
an object. As shown in Figure 2-6, a subject is an active entity (a user, program or process) that 
requests access to an object or the data within an object. On the other side, an object is a passive 
entity (computer, database, file, computer program, directory or field contained in a table within a 
database) that contains information or needed functionality [16].  
 
Figure 2-6 Access control principals 
 
Discretionary access control 
In a discretionary access control (DAC) model, the owner of the object controls the initial 
assignment and subsequent propagation of all privileges associated with an object. It means that 
the data owners decide who has access to resources, and ACLs are used to enforce these access 
decisions [16]. In a discretionary access control model, access is restricted based on the 
authorization granted to the users so the users are allowed to specify what type of access can 
occur to the objects they own. DAC policies are based on the recognition of subject. In this 
model a user has full control over all the programs it owns and executes and also determines the 
permissions other users have those files and programs. Because DAC requires permissions to be 
assigned to those who need access, DAC is commonly called described as a "need-to-know" 
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access model and commercial operating systems typically enforce this model of access controls. 
The systems that use discretionary access control model grant or deny access based on the 
identity of the subject. This identity can be either a user identity or a group membership. Thus, 
for instance, a data owner can choose to allow Mr. X (who is a user identity) and the Accounting 
group (which is a membership identity) to access his files [16].  
 
Mandatory access control 
In mandatory access control (MAC), it is the system (and not the users) that specifies which 
subjects can access specific data objects. The MAC model is based on security labels. Subjects 
are given a security clearance (secret, top secret, confidential, etc.), and data objects are given a 
security classification (secret, top secret, confidential, etc.). The clearance and classification data 
are stored in the security labels, which are bound to the specific subjects and objects. When the 
system is making an access control decision, it tries to match the clearance of the subject with the 
classification of the object. For example, if a user has a security clearance of secret, and he 
requests a data object with a security classification of top secret, then the user will be denied 
access because his clearance is lower than the classification of the object. 
The MAC model is usually used in environments where confidentiality is of utmost importance, 
such as a military institution. Examples of the MAC-based commercial systems are SE Linux and 
Trusted Solaris. 
 
Role Based Access Control 
Role-based access control (RBAC) was introduced by Ferraiolo and Kuhn and became the 
predominant model for advanced access control.  In RBAC model, the system administrators 
create roles according to the job function that are preformed in an organization, then grant proper 
permissions to those roles and finally assign users to the roles on the basis of their specific job 
responsibilities and qualifications [40]. Using a centrally administrated set of controls, RBAC 
model determines how subjects and objects interact, it also uses specific rules that indicate what 
can and cannot happen between a subject and an object [16].  
The RBAC model is the best choice for the companies with high volume of turnover. For 
example if Mr. X who is working as a contractor in Alpha Inc., leaves the company, then Mrs. Y, 
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his replacement, can be easily mapped to this role. Using this model can save administration time 
for continually changing the ACLs on the individual objects. In this case the administration only 
need to create a role (e.g., contractor) and then assign permissions to this role and map the new 
user to the existing role. We can conclude that RBAC approach simplifies access control 
administration and can save lots of manpower time by allowing permission to be managed in 
terms of user job role [16]. 
2.5.2 Existing methods and models 
In this section, we study existing security architectures and methods for controlling the 
access to data and information in multi-tenancy cloud environment.  
Access control in cloud environments 
In a cloud computing environment, it is utmost important to verify the identity and the 
access privileges of the service consumers before they are allowed to access the various resources 
or services hosted by the service providers. For preventing the unauthorized or illegal access of 
the cloud resources, it is extremely important to authenticate the requesting users and authorize 
their access privileges. So, in a cloud computing scenario, the access control of distributed 
resources is very vital in securing the cloud.  
In this thesis, we studied different access control methods for cloud computing 
environments. For instance: 
• Distributed access control (DAC) proposed by [41] 
• Adaptive access algorithm proposed by [42] 
• CloudPolice [43] 
• Multi-tenancy based access control model (MTACM) [44] 
• Role-based multi-tenancy access control (RB-MTAC) [45] 
 
In the following sections, we will go through all the above-mentioned models and 
architectures to find out what are the existing access control models in cloud computing 
environments.  
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Thomas et al. [41] proposed an architecture for the distributed access control (DAC) in 
the cloud computing paradigm that three major components as bellow: 
1. Cloud service provider (CSP) 
2. Cloud service consumer (CSC) 
3. Identity provider (IdP) 
 
Figure 2-7 Architecture for the access control in cloud environments [41] 
As illustrated in Figure 2-7, cloud service consumers (CSC) request the resources or 
services hosted by the cloud service providers (CSPs). In this stage, the CSC should be 
authenticated first to ensure that unauthorized users do not access the services from the CSP. The 
main responsibility of cloud service provider (CSP) is to host and to provide the various services 
or resources to the cloud service consumers. So, for avoiding illegal and unauthorized access by 
CSCs, proper authorization and authentication of CSCs are required. A user or an organization in 
a cloud environment may subscribe to services from multiple CSPs to meet the resource 
requirements; in this case a federated identity management approach (such as Single Sign-On 
authentication) is required. The CSCs can use the identity tokens generated by the Identity 
Providers (IdP) and these cloud users can exchange the security tokens generated by the Identity 
Providers with various Cloud Service Providers in the federation [41]. 
We can summarize the workflow of the access control architecture proposed by Thomas 
et al. [41] as following: 
sites. Distributed-DEBAC, in which access control policies
can be specified for distributed system, even if only partial
information about location of resources is available, is
discussed.
In [10], a Trust and Context based Access Control
(TCAC) model is proposed for open and distributed
systems. Role assignment in TCAC is based on the
trustworthiness and context information of users. A
trust evaluation mechanism based on the local and global
reputation, to compute the trust value of a user in distributed
system is provided. When a request comes from a user
whose trust value meets the threshold of trust defined by
the system, the user will be assigned to some roles. The
credibility based access control model is given in [11]. Since
the access control policies in the server change very often
in open distributed systems, the service providers adjust the
threshold value of credibility and weight factor, instead of
changing policies in the server. The threshold value of trust
for the service providers is registered on the servers. If
the trust value of the requestor meets this threshold value,
the requestor is granted access rights to the Service Provider.
In [12], the authors present the design of the security
layer for a distributed system located in the multi-zone
hierarchical computer network. The computer network, in
which the system works, is divided into some zones and the
zones are arranged in the hierarchical order. Depending on
the zone from which a clients request comes to the system
and the type of the request, it will be either authorized or
rejected. This system enforces a multi-layer authentication
and authorization, and the privileges are given to t digital
identity of the user. In the first layer, the users authentication
is performed using the Single Sign On mechanism. In the
second one, the system authenticates itself to the business
layer using the protocol based on the digital certificates.
The user permissions are derived from the users roles and
the systems roles.
The authors in [13] put forward an access control model,
based on roles and trust values of subjects and objects.
Users and systems give values for each other, after every
operation. In this work, the RBAC model is extended by
adding the trust factor. Various trust features are identified
and presented in this paper. Calculation of trust value,
which involves the users and resources giving grades each
other, and that of trust propagation value also is given.
A framework for the verification of run-time dynamic
constraints and security properties for RBAC systems
is presented in [14]. Concurrent sessions and runtime
authorization decision parameters are taken into
consideration. The users can activate and deactivate
multiple roles in the same session as long as the run-time
constraints are satisfied. Decision parameters, including
the temporal and location based ones are discussed in this
work. A Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanism for
distributed High Performance Computing (HPC) systems
is given in [15]. In this work, users and resources are
considered dynamic, and belong to various organizations
with different security policies and mechanisms.
In [16], the issue of identity management in the cloud
computing scenario is discussed. They also show the privacy
issues associated with cloud computing. The paper gives a
review of the existing approaches in identity management
in cloud computing. In this work, loss of user control,
lack of trust between various entities and the multitenancy
issues are considered as the major problems in the cloud
computing model.
Based on the literature review, we understand that ample
scope exists for the research in the field of authorization,
towards developing a reliable and scalable access control
system for the cloud environment. The proper solution for
the issue of access control in the distributed computing,
especially cloud computing, needs extensive research in
the area of trust establishment, conflict management of
organizational policies for accessing various resources, and
proper break-glass mechanism for dealing with the emer-
gency requirements of the cloud customers.
III. ARCHITECTURE FOR THE ACCESS CONTROL IN
CLOUD ENVIRONMENTS
Based on the analysis of the w rks carried ut in the area,
we propose the architecture for the access control in cloud
computing environments as shown in the Figure-1.
The major components in the proposed architecture are:
1. Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 2. Cloud Service Consumer
(CSC) and 3. Identity Provider (IdP).
Figure 1. Architecture for the Access Control in Cloud Environments
228
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(i) CSC aims to access services hosted by the CSP, 
(ii) CSP sends the authentication request to CSP, 
(iii) CSC interacts with IdP to get the security tokens, 
(iv) CSC interacts with CSC using the token issued by IdP, 
(v) CSP authenticate the CSC by interacting the IdP, 
(vi) The response to access request is communicated to the CSC.  
Analysis and results of the above security architecture reveal that using a distributed 
access control (DAC) is very important in the domain of distributed application or services 
computing.  At the same time this model has some limitations, since there is no single effective 
mechanism for DAC, which meets all the access control requirements of the Cloud computing 
domain, more researches must be carried out in that area.  
 
Wang et al. [42], suggest an adaptive access algorithm by introducing the trust into  cloud 
computing. Their aim is to solve more complex and difficult problems in the cloud computing 
environments by deciding the access control to the resources using an improved BRAC 
technique. The proposed security model determines dynamically security level and access control 
for the common resources. Thus, this architecture is supposed to provide appropriate security 
services according to the dynamic changes of the common resources. The proposed access 
control model is based on trust and determines whether the user has the right to get access to the 
resource by dynamically authorizing. This access control model claims that it can effectively 
control the user’s malicious behavior. 
In fact, M. Blaze proposed the concept of trust management in 1996. But Wang et al., 
they just took advantage of this concept and they added the concept of trust into role based access 
control (RBAC). This trust model is based on loyalty; it means that a user is restricted only when 
its behavior contains malicious behavior. In other words, a user can get access to resource or not 
dynamically based on a calculation. Wang calculates the user’s trust by user’s behavior when it 
successes or fails and base it to attribute user’s right.   
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There is a difference between traditional access control mechanisms and trust-role-based 
dynamic access control mechanisms and it is the fact that the user’s role can control policy by its 
respective trust level.  Thus, trust is an important element when assigning roles to the users in a 
trust based access control model. This model is able to control the user’s access to the resource 
orderly through establishing the dynamic mapping between roles and trust values.  
 
 
Figure 2-8 Dynamic authorization process based on trust in cloud computing 
Figure 2-8 illustrates the process of dynamic authorization in a trust-role-based access 
control. In this process, the user’s request should be analyzed first and the based on the trust 
evaluation, the user become authorized dynamically. The advantage of trust-role-based-access 
control approach are to extend the trusted computing technology into the cloud computing 
environment to achieve the trusted computing requirements for the cloud computing and then 
fulfill the trusted cloud computing. At the same time, this model needs to be developed more in 
order to become widely used.  
 
Lucian Popa et al. [43], proposed CloudPolice, a system that implements a hypervisor-
based access control mechanism. In 2010 they examined some types of access control (AC) 
policies (listed bellow) that they believe are important for multi-tenant clouds and from these 
examples they derived policy model and the used that policy model for design of their proposal. 
These access control policies are shortly explained bellow [43]: 
• Tenant Isolation 
This access control policy is the most common and simplest prevention method for 
DoS attack.  Tenant isolation simply prevents host from being compromised. This 
access control policy is traditionally implemented by VLAN (Virtual Local Area 
Network) but it is not a good solution for cloud environments.   
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• Inter-Tenant Communication 
Cloud computing offers a shared environment that will enable users to offer each 
other services more easily than with traditional business models.  
• Fair-Sharing among Tenants 
Fair sharing is a concept that prevents tenants with more machines or higher 
available bandwidth from getting better service. Fair-sharing also prevent these 
tenants from impacting the services available to other tenants more than their fair-
share.  
• Rate Limiting Tenants 
Cloud computing provide us the “pay-as-you-go” pricing model. Some malicious 
agents may utilize this pricing model and they may financially damage their 
victims by increasing the bandwidth usage of each VM being attacked.   
• Allowing Locally Initiated Connections 
Stateful firewalls can be implemented into traditional networks. Using that 
firewalls we can permit incoming traffics that are initiated from inside the 
network. Unfortunately this feature is not available in current cloud provider APIs.  
Using the above examples, Lucian Popa abstracted a general AC policy model to be 
supported by cloud providers. They choose hypervisor-based approach for implementing 
CloudPolice policy model because hypervisors are trusted, network-independent, close to VM 
and fully software programmable.   
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Figure 2-9 CloudPolice overview [43] 
As demonstrated in Figure 2-9, when source VM initiate a new flow, the source 
hypervisor sends a control packet to the destination hypervisor. This control packet specifies the 
security group to which the source VM belongs (Step 1). As soon as the control packet reaches 
the source hypervisor, it will be checked by destination hypervisor to verify the policy for the 
group of the destination VM (Step 2). If the policy allows the traffic, then the state of the traffic 
will be created for this flow by the destination hypervisor. But if the traffic is not allowed or 
should be rated limited, the control packet will be sent back to source hypervisor to block or rate-
limit the flow or the VM (Step 3).  
As mentioned before, CloudPolice acts somehow as stateful firewalls and create state for 
each flow. Having this in mind, there are two major concerns for the feasibility of CloudPolice. 
First concern is the ability of hypervisor to act on per flow state because we explained before that 
CloudPolice is a hypervisor-based AC policy. So, the hypervisor should be ready to act on every 
single flow. The second concern is the ability of hypervisor to install new state with low enough 
latencies for new traffic flows. At this moment that we are conducting this research, only 
prototype of CloudPolice is implemented using the Open VSwitch. So we should make sure that 
hypervisor is able to create state for each new incoming flow very fast. In an experiment 
environment the number of VMs in hypervisor are limited but in a real cloud computing 
environment the number of VMs can be quiet a bit. Thus, the hypervisor should be able to create 
state for all new flows without latency (or at least with acceptable latency) and also act on the 
existing state that already exist on the buffer.  
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Figure 1: CloudPolice Overview
is sent before the the packets b longing to the flow (step
1). When the destination hypervisor receives such a control
packet, it checks the policy for the group of the destination
VM (step 2). If the policy allows the traffic, the destina-
tion hypervisor creates state for this flow; subsequent pack-
ets will be forwarded u to the destination VM by using this
entry. If the traffic is not allowed or should be rate limited,
the destination hypervisor will send a control packet back to
the source hypervisor to block or rate-limit the flow or the
VM (step 3). By default, VMs are blocked if the policy con-
tains no rule for that traffic.
3.3 Detailed Design
Soft State: CloudPolice maintains soft state (i.e., removed
after expiration) to enforce the policy actions (block, remove
and rate-limit). After the expiration of the soft state, the en-
tire process for setting up the state is restarted. Soft state
makes it easier to support VM migration and handle packet
losses. In our current design, revocation is also handled th-
rough the expiration of the soft state. However, explicit state
invalidation on p licy updat s could be implemented, by us-
ing control packets between hypervisors in a similar fashion.
Control Packets: There are three types of control packets
sent between hypervisors: (a) sent by a source hypervisor
(step 1 in Fig. 1), (b) sent by a destination hypervisor to
block or rate limit the traffic (step 3 in Fig. 1) and (c) sent by
a destination hypervisor to query the source hypervisor, as
we will describe later. For case (a), the packet contains the
header of the first data packet of that flow, which is used for
the destination hypervisor to check its policy. For case (b),
the packet specifies if the action should be applied per flow
or per VM and the value of the rate limit; to block packets
the rate limit is set to zero. Control packets are distinguished
from the rest of the data packets by using a special transport
protocol number in the IP header (e.g., the protocol number
254, reserved for testing).
Lost/Reordered Control Packets: First, assume the packet
sent by the source hypervisor containing the group of the
source VM (type (a) above) is lost. If a destination hyper-
visor receives a flow for which it has no entry, it sets up a
querying state for the flow and sends a “querying” control
message to the source hypervisor (type (c) aforementioned).
At the receipt of the querying message, the source hyper-
visor resends the type (a) control packet. There is a timer
associated with the querying state and a new request is made
to the source hypervisor when it x ires, i.e., in the case the
querying control packet is lost. Second, assume a type (b)
control packet, sent by the destination hypervisor, is lost and
the destination receives unwanted traffic. In this case, the
destination hypervisor sets up a short term state to block the
incoming traffic, waiting for the shut- ff messag (in Fig. 1)
to arrive at the source hypervisor. If packets are still received
after a short timeout, the destination hypervisor sends back
another shut-off packet. In case of rate limiting, the des-
tination monitors the incoming rate and if the limit is not
respected, it sends back a new control packet to the source
hypervisor.
Policy Updates: We envision two models for distributing
and updating policies to hypervisors. In the first model, the
cloud provider uploads the group policy to the hypervisor
at the VM startup and updates it at all the group members
when the policy changes. Since policy changes should be
infrequent, we do not expect this service to be a burden for
the cloud provider. In a second model, VMs can directly
communicate their policies to hypervisors. This model does
ot require a policy management service from the cloud pro-
vider but requires and additional API in both the hypervisor
and the VMs.
Global Policies: Some policies may require hypervisors to
have knowledge about all the VMs belonging to a group.
For example, a policy might specify th t the aggregate traf-
fic from all the VMs of group A to be rate limited when ac-
cessing the VMs of group B. Such a policy requires commu-
nication between the hypervisors hosting B’ VMs since the
decision should be taken using an aggregate state; this re-
quires hypervisors to know all the members of the group for
their hosted VMs. Due to space constraints we do not dis-
cuss such policies in this paper, but we note that techniques
such as in [22] can be applied.
4
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Xiao-Yong et al. [44], in 2010 designed Multi-tenancy based access control model 
(MTACM) which is a security architecture to embed the security duty separation principle in 
multi-tenancy cloud environments. MTACM is a two-granule level access control mechanism. 
One is tenant granule for CSP to compartmentalize different users and customers, the other one is 
application granule specified for customers and users to control the access to their own 
application. Limiting the management privilege of CSP and letting the customers to manage the 
security of their own business is the main idea of MTACM. Beside that, the aim of this security 
architecture is to help CSP to separate customers and make them secure their own applications 
and data [44]. Nginx, which is an open source proxy, was chosen for the implementation base of 
MTACM. Nginx enables developers to add extra security modules to provide value-added 
features.  
 
Figure 2-10 A prototype of MTACM [44] 
As illustrated in Figure 2-10, there are five functional modules and two management 
interfaces. Functional modules are listed below [44]: 
• OpenSSL modules – is an Nginx built-in module, which is activated to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of communication during customers, access their 
cloud services in MTACM. 
• Identification and Authentication modules –  
 
 
Definition 1: To any subject u identified by cloud, u ∈ 
S, and any object o in cloud, o ∈ R, u and o are related if ∃t 
∈ T, u ∈ t.s and o ∈ t.r. 
Rule 1: To any subject u identified by cloud, u ∈ S, 
and any object o in cloud, o ∈ R, u can access o with a 
privilege of a iff: 
1) u and o are related 
2) <u, o, a> ∈ L 
Rule 2(tenant rule):  
1) Cloud tenant set T can only be managed by CSP, 
that is, only CSP have privilege to add or remove 
elements into or from T when a new customer has 
subscribed the cloud service;  
2) Each tenant can only be initialized by CSP, 
including assigning a management subject for the 
tenant, e.g., when a new tenant t is added to T, 
CSP must add a management subject u (generally 
supplied by customer) into t.s, this is also the only 
one elements that CSP can add into t.s. 
3) CSP have no control on tenant after the above 
initialization process finished.  
Rule 3(Application rule): After initialization, a tenant 
can only be controlled by the management subject of that 
tenant, including: 
1) Subject management. The management subject of 
a tenant t can add or remove a subject into or from 
t.s, in addition, this subject has privilege to change 
the attributes of its related subjects, such as the 
role and security label; 
2) Object management. The management subject of a 
tenant t can add or remove an object into or from 
t.r, in addition, this subject has privilege to change 
the attributes of its related objects, such as the 
security label; 
3) ACL management. The management subject of a 
tenant t can add or remove an ACL entry <u, o, a> 
into or from L only if u ∈ t.s and o ∈ t.r. 
MTACM conformed to the realistic management 
process of public cloud. When a new customer is added or 
an existing customer quit, the service account should be 
updated, this cloud account management is of course the 
CSP’ responsibility and it has no relationship with 
customers (see term 1 of rule 2). When registering a new 
customer, CSP will require the information of the security 
manager of the customer. After that, the customer will take 
over the management of their own security, this is also the 
boundary of security duty separation between CSP and 
customers (see term 2 of rule 2). CSP have no further 
control to the customers’ internal security management. 
After the customers have taken over the management 
of their own applications, CSP have no further control to 
the customers’ internal security management. This is shown 
in rule 3.  
Specifically, the security manager of each customer 
(e.g., tenant t) has the following rights:  
z Adding or removing subjects into or from the 
user database as t.s, (see term 1 of rule 3); 
z Adding or removing objects into or from the 
resource database as t.r, (see term 2 of rule 3);  
z Adding or removing a security policy such as an 
access control rules (see term 3 of rule 3); 
however, the manager of a customer can only 
manage the security of its own according to rule 
3.  
The format of access control rules is different from 
that of traditional firewalls. The subjects in MTACM ACL 
rules are users based rather than IP addres s bas d and this 
is helpful to the situation in which cloud users have no 
fixed IP addresses. MTACM supports the dynamical 
connections between users’ identification and their 
instantaneous IP addresses. 
In addition to its original desig  goals, MTACM has 
also other benefits like: it needed not modify legacy 
applications; it was application aware and its security rules 
were based on user identifications rather than IP addresses.   
IV. A PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
We have implemented a prototype of MTACM shown 
in figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: A prototype of MTACM 
 
In the prototype system, the host platform was an x86 
based server with a configuration of: Intel Core 2 Quad 
Q6600 CPU, 4G memory and 250G hard disk. We installed 
CentOS a the Host OS. 
We chose Nginx as the implementation base of 
MTACM. Nginx is an open source proxy over which 
developers can add extra security modules to provide 
value-added features. 
Over the Nginx module, there were five functional 
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• Audit modules – to record all the activities of security management and all 
accesses to cloud.  
• Access control modules - to enforce DAC and MAC mechanisms.  
• Management modules – to support the security duty separation mechanism 
between CSP and customer. This module has two separate interfaces: 
o CSP Management Interface (management control suites such as tenant adding, 
tenant removing and tenant management appointment are located in this 
interface) 
o Customer Management Interface (management controls such as user adding, 
user removing, object adding, object removing and ACL management are 
located in this interface) 
We mentioned before that MTACM aims to separate security responsibilities between 
cloud service providers and customer. This security architecture, defines different management 
domains for CSP and customers. It means that customers should take the responsibility of 
managing and controlling their objects on the cloud.   
Currently, most CSP perform customer compartmentalization and application access 
control by deploying firewalls [46, 47]. Figure 2-11 shows that different instances running on the 
same physical machine are isolated from each other via Amazon Web Service (AWS) firewall 
that resides within the hypervisor layer, between the physical network interface and the instance’s 
virtual interface. But firewalls are not designed for this type of tasks and a firewall cannot handle 
this job because they do not use fixed IP address to access cloud resources.  
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Figure 2-11 Instance isolation using firewall [47] 
2.6 Problem and challenges 
In this chapter, we performed a literature review in order to find out the works that has been 
done in the field of access control in cloud computing environments. Particularly, we discussed 
the existing methods of controlling access in context of multi-tenancy cloud computing. 
We first considered distributed access control (DAC) architecture that was in the cloud 
computing paradigm [41]. This security architecture has three major components such as cloud 
service provider (CSP), cloud service consumer (CSC) and identity provider (IdP). In this 
architecture, the identity provider plays a great role because it should generate the identity token 
for users. By using this identity token, a user can request the access to the cloud. The main 
challenge with this architecture is that, there is no single effective mechanism for the DAC, 
which meets all the access control requirements of the cloud computing domain.  
Furthermore, we’ve studied the adaptive access algorithm that is based on introducing the 
trust into cloud computing [42]. In this model the purpose of introducing the trust into cloud 
computing is to decide the access control to the resources. Wang et al. believe that using an 
improved RBAC technique they can solve more complex and difficult access control problem in 
the cloud computing environment. Trust base access control model uses trust as an important 
basis when assigning roles to the users. In other words, by establishing the dynamic mapping 
between roles and trust values, this model is able to control the user’s access to the resources. 
This model has some advantages like extending the trusted computing technology into the cloud 
!!
36 
computing. The main disadvantage of this model is that, it depends on the trust values and 
unfortunately the trust evaluation process is not developed yet and it needs to be improved more.  
 Then we studied multi-tenancy access control model (MTACM) [44] which is security 
architecture to embed the security duty separation principle in multi-tenancy cloud environments. 
The main idea of MTACM is based on limiting the management privilege of CSP and letting the 
customers to manage the security of their own business is the main idea of MTACM. In this 
security model, the duty separation mechanism between cloud service provider and cloud 
customer is handled by management module. In fact, the main drawback of MTACM is this 
management module. Because this management module is not user friendly for customers and the 
cloud customer has to take care of the security of their data.  
For complimentary, we reviewed role-based multi-tenancy access control scheme for 
cloud services [45]. The RB-MTAC applies identity management to determine the user’s identity 
and applicable roles. In fact, this RB-MTAC combines tow important concepts in access control 
under the MTA environment, these two concepts are the identity management and also role-based 
access control. Yang et al, they believe that this combination makes it easier to manage privileges 
that protect the security of application systems and data privacy. Providing a set of privileges and 
also identity management scheme for corporations in cloud computing environment is the main 
contribution of this security model. This scheme can be used to easily change employee 
privileges in the when personnel leave an organization or when we want to grant more access to 
them without the need to modify all employee privileges on e by one. But the main disadvantage 
of RB-MTAC is that it is not independent and for implementing this security model in a cloud 
computing system, a directory service is needed. 
Finally, we reviewed CloudPolice [43], an interesting access control method for multi-
tenancy cloud computing environments. This security architecture attracted our attention because 
is seems to be effective and can prevent denial of service (DoS) attack, which is one the major 
issues in cloud environments. This security architecture can prevent malicious agents from 
sending unauthorized traffic to their targets. But a careful study about CloudPolice reveals that it 
imposes some overheads into the system. In this model, the destination hypervisor receives all the 
traffic and decide to pass or drop the traffic based on the security attributes of the target virtual 
machines. In this model, every single flow should travel from source hypervisor to the destination 
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hypervisor and because of this fact; still a malicious agent can exhaust the bandwidth of the link 
between source hypervisor and the destination hypervisor.  
Through this literature review, we studied possible algorithms and systems of controlling 
access in multi-tenancy cloud environments. This state of art enables us to build on this 
knowledge in order to build a solution of our own in the course of the forthcoming chapters.  
38
CHAPTER 3 PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter presents the architecture to improve the access control of the multi-tenancy 
cloud environments. Firstly, we will explore a scenario for our project, which has two main 
phases. Later on we will define the requirements of the security architecture that we want to 
design. Finally, we will explain the design and basis of the proposal; this part includes 
assumptions, principles, elements and topology of the architecture.  
3.1 Scenario 
In this section we will define a scenario and by doing that we will be able to tackle 
particular security issues. Evidently, this use case is in the context of cloud computing and 
especially in the context of multi-tenancy environments. We will analyze this scenario in order to 
define the most relevant answer to a particular problem that is unauthorized access of the VMs 
for sending unauthorized traffic to other VMs. As we mentioned before, this security architecture 
aims to secure the access control. So, use case is the key to the definition of our requirements.  
This scenario is the simplest one possible and is illustrated in Figure 3-1. In this example, 
we have a public cloud that is connected to the Internet using router and three physical servers 
that are connected to a layer-2 switch. The function of the router in this scenario is to route the 
internal traffic of the cloud to the internet and vice versa. Apparently, the layer-3 switch in this 
scenario serves as a controller, enabling networked devices to talk to each other efficiently. In 
this scenario, there are 3 physical servers as well as 10 virtual machines. These virtual machines 
belong to 4 tenants. Multi-tenancy topology of this cloud is as bellow: 
• Physical Server 1: Tenant 1 (VM1, VM2) and Tenant 2 (VM3)
• Physical Server 2: Tenant 1 (VM4, VM5) and Tenant 3 (VM6, VM7)
• Physical Server 3: Tenant 4 (VM8) and Tenant 3 (VM9, VM10)
For the purpose of load balancing, this cloud provider has decided to use the above
topology. Load balancing is dividing the amount of work load that a physical server has to handle 
between two or more physical servers so that more work load gets done in the same amount of 
time and, in general, all users get served faster. That is why some VMs that belong to tenant-1 are 
located on the physical server 1 and the rest of them reside on the another physical server.  
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According the above explanation about the load balancing in virtual environments, VMs 
that belong to tenant 1 are located on the physical server 1 and physical server 2. Also for the 
same reason the virtual machines of tenant number 3 is distributed into physical server number 2 
and physical server number 3. But the tenant number 4 has only one virtual machine that is 
located on the physical server number 3.  
It is necessary to mention that in this scenario, the process of the controlling the access is 
done in the hypervisors. Apparently, the ACL (access control list) database resides on the 
hypervisors and once traffic is entering the hypervisor the relevant ACL for the traffic should be 
exists there.  
Figure 3-1 Use case scenario for multi-tenancy cloud access control 
This scenario has two phases; the first phase consists of generating the control packets. 
This control packet contains information about the traffic that a source VM wants to send to a 
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destination VM. In the second phase, the destination hypervisor investigates the information and 
decides about the destiny of the packet. In the following section, we go through each phase in 
detail.  
Phase One: 
In the first part of the scenario, the VM Source sends a flow of traffic to the hypervisor 
source as it is illustrated in the stage 1 of the Figure 3-2. Obviously, the VM source and the 
hypervisor source are co-located on the same physical server. Then the hypervisor source 
generates a packet that is called control packet[43]. This control packet contains some 
information about the source address, destination address and port number. As illustrated in stage 
2 of the Figure 3-2, when the control packet is generated based on the information in the data 
packet, the source hypervisor sends the control packet to the hypervisor destination in order to 
check the access control policy of the VM destination.  
Figure 3-2 Phase one, generating control packet by source hypervisor 
So, in the first phase of the scenario, the hypervisor source generates the control packet. 
The content of this control packet is based on the traffic that is to be sent from source VM3 to 
destination VM8. As soon as the source hypervisor generates the control packet, it sends this 
control packet to the hypervisor destination.  
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Phase Two: 
In this phase, the control packet arrives to the destination hypervisor. Then the destination 
hypervisor checks the access control lists (ACLs) to verify if the VM source is authorized to send 
that traffic to the destination VM8. If the ACLs related to the destination VM8 match, then the 
destination hypervisor sends back a pass value within the control packet called response control 
packet to the source hypervisor as it is illustrated in the stage 3 of the Figure 3-3. The purpose of 
this response control packet is that, the hypervisor source can decide what to do with the traffic – 
that is waiting in the source hypervisor - according to this response control packet. 
Hence, if the security attributes of the destination VM8 do not match the data packet, then the 
destination hypervisor sends a drop signal to source hypervisor.    
In this phase, there can be different possibilities as bellow and our proposed architecture will 
be able to cover and work in any possible situation.  
• Source VM and destination VM are located on the same physical server but belong to
deferent tenant
• Source VM and destination VM are located on the same physical server and belong to the
same tenant
• Source VM and destination VM are located on the different physical server but belong to
the same tenant
• Source VM and destination VM are located on the different physical Server and belong to
different tenant
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Figure 3-3 Phase two, generating control packet response by destination hypervisor 
3.2 Requirements 
In order to build and design architecture for securing access control for multi-tenancy 
cloud environments, we need some requirements and criterions. In the following section we 
describe the requirements of access control security architecture.  
3.2.1 Scalability 
Scalability is one of the characteristics of the cloud computing environments. So, the 
security architecture should be scalable enough to cover this growth rate. As reported by Amazon 
Web Service, Inc. (AWS), in 2013 ,each day near 100K new VMs started [43]. This report shows 
that the cloud computing infrastructure is huge; therefore, our security architecture should easily 
leverage this incredible infrastructure scale. In this scale, one VM may communicate with many 
other VMs in the cloud, so controlling the access of network entities to the network resources is a 
vital part of securing cloud infrastructure.   
3.2.2 Security 
The access control security architecture that is designed for multi-tenancy cloud 
environments should be able to maintain the security of information of all the tenants and users. 
In a multi-tenancy context, access of VMs should be controlled. So, a VM should only have 
access to other VMs if it is authorized. In our security architecture design, only authorized VMs 
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are able to send traffic to other VMs. If a VM sends unauthorized traffic to another VM, the 
source hypervisor drops the traffic packet.   
3.2.3 Control 
Controls are countermeasures to minimize the security risks and also to avoid them. Access 
control is an effective tool to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
in a multi-tenancy cloud environment. This security architecture is designed to enforce the access 
control lists. In the traditional network environments, the traffic flow pass through the security 
devices such as firewalls or layer-3 routers. But in virtualized environments, the traffic passes 
through the vSwitch of hypervisor rather than security devices. So, the security architecture of 
access control should be able to enforce the ACLs in a way that, it prevent unauthorized access to 
the cloud.  
3.2.4 Performance 
By dropping the unauthorized traffics in the source hypervisor, we can avoid unnecessary 
traffic in the cloud environment. A malicious tenant in a cloud system can target another tenant 
and generates tones of unnecessary packets to consume the cloud system resources and make the 
cloud resources unavailable to for other tenants. So, if the security architecture prevents the 
unauthorized traffic, the bandwidth of the network can be dedicated only to authorized traffic and 
this can improve the performance of the network. 
3.3 Architecture overview 
The idea behind this architecture is that a virtual machine in a multi-tenancy cloud system 
should not be able to send traffic to another VM unless that virtual machine belongs to the same 
tenant and/or this VM is authorized to send the traffic to the other VMs. We propose a security 
architecture that prevents tenants of cloud computing environment to send unauthorized traffic to 
other tenants.  
This security design deals with the concept of Inter-VM traffic, which is transmission of 
any data packet to and from one virtual machine. In the other words, when the hypervisor 
encounter Inter-VM traffic, the traffic does not pass through physical switch or router in a cloud 
system and the virtual switch that is located in the hypervisor forward the packet to the 
!!
44 
destination VM. Once the architecture is fully presented in this chapter, then, a detail analysis on 
how the requirements are met by the proposal will be done in the next chapter.  
3.3.1 Assumptions 
The idea behind this architecture is securing access control in multi-tenancy cloud 
environments; however there are some assumptions that need to be done at this point as a way to 
present achievable goals at this stage in the design process.  
• Concerning the entire system, we assume that entire virtual machines and physical servers
are co-located and on the same cloud provider. If the entire system is not part of a cloud,
then for sending traffic to another cloud, the traffic should pass through a real router or
firewall. In this case we should enforce the policies that are in the firewall.
• Furthermore, we assume that each physical server on the cloud has only one hypervisor.
In this case, security attributes and access control lists of all virtual machines that belong
to a physical server are located in one hypervisor. If we have multiple hypervisors on a
physical server, then we should apply an extra process for realizing which hypervisor
contains access control lists of certain virtual machine.
• Additionally, we assume that each physical server is hosting at least one tenant and each
tenant has at least one virtual machine. Because each virtual machine should be registered
as a Tenant in the system. If a tenant is registered in the cloud, consequently a virtual
machine should be assigned to that tenant, if not, that empty tenant can cause point of
weakness in the cloud.
• It is very important to mention that the goal of this project is not to design or define the
security access control policies, so we assume that all access control lists are defined and
stored in the hypervisor. Therefore, it is very important to store the access lists in the
hypervisor, not in the middle boxes.
• In order for our security design to work, each hypervisor should receive periodic updates
about IP address of virtual machines that are located on entire cloud. So, we assume that
in the start up process of a hypervisor, it sends an update message to other hypervisors
that are located on the same cloud. This update message contains the IP address and the
ID of virtual machines that are located on that hypervisor.
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Having the above-mentioned assumptions in mind, we will explain the different aspects of 
this security architecture down the road to the rest of this chapter.   
3.3.2 Architecture principles 
The principles of the proposed architecture are based on control packet, which is the core 
element of verifying security permissions of virtual machines in a multi-tenancy cloud 
environment. Figure 3-4 depicts the general architecture of our security design and in this section 
we explain it in detail.  
Figure 3-4 Principles of security architecture 
• Source (Src.) VM is a virtual machine that is located on the source hypervisor. This
hypervisor is located on the source physical server. Source VM is sending some traffic
packets to another virtual machine in the same cloud that is called destination
• Destination (Des.) VM is located on the destination hypervisor and obviously this
hypervisor is located on the destination physical server.
• Data Packet is the original packet that source VM wants to send to destination VM.
• Control Packet is a special packet that is generated by source hypervisor. The content of
this packet represents the specifications of Source VM and the destination VM.
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• Incoming/Outgoing traffic filter is a lightweight IDS that is integrated in the hypervisor. It
simply compares the control packet with the access control lists of destination VM.
• Access control list is a set of security permission that defines the level of security of each
virtual machine.
3.3.3 Control packet 
Control packet is a set of bytes called frame tag that we add to the IP packet[43]. These 
bytes are inserted after IP header and at the beginning of the payload as it is shown below. The 
frame tag in our architecture has two main parts: Header of the first data packet of the flow as 
well as the action command value.    
Figure 3-5 Control packet 
TCP or UDP: 
The first frame tag that is inserted into the control packet shows the type of Internet 
Protocol (IP) traffic. Due to the fact that there are two types of IP traffics (Transmission Control 
Protocol and User Datagram Protocol), this tag determines the type of IP traffic. If the traffic is 
TCP traffic, then the TCP tag will be inserted to this place. But if the traffic is UDP, 
consequently the UDP tag will be inserted to this place. 
Header of the First Data Packet: 
The second frame tag that is inserted into the control packet is Header of the First Data 
Packet. When a traffic flow arrives the source hypervisor, only the first data packet of that traffic 
flow is chosen and the header of this data packet will be inserted to the control packet. Although 
each IP protocol has a specific IP header fields, there are some fields that are the same between 
both UDP and TCP protocols[48]. Therefore, for this part of the frame tag, we use the value 
fields that are the same such as: 
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Source Address could be any class (A, B, C or D) of IP address that is assigned to the source VM 
by dynamic host control protocol (DHCP) service or manually.  
Destination Address is the again an IP address that is assigned to destination VM. 
Port Number is the Internet socket port number that is used by protocols of the transport layer of 
the internet protocol suite for the establishment of host-to-host communication [48].  
Protocol here is whether transmission control protocol (TCP) or user datagram protocol (UDP) 
that is a transportation protocol and one of the core protocols of the internet protocol suite [48].  
Action Tag 
The action tag is a value that is inserted to the control packet by the destination hypervisor 
or source hypervisor and specifies what action should be applied to the traffic flow. Generally 
there can be three different values for the action tag. 
• NULL Value: Initially, this action tag value is inserted to the control packet by source
hypervisor when it generates the control packet. In fact, the action tag field is reserved for
destination hypervisor. When the source hypervisor generates the control packet, the
action tag should be left empty so that the destination hypervisor insert the proper value to
this empty field. Consequently, when the destination hypervisor wants to send back the
response control packet, it uses this field to insert the proper value. But, in some cases, if
the destination VM is not found in the destination hypervisor, this value remains empty
(the same NULL value). In this case, this empty value resembles no decision and the
source hypervisor should take another extra actions for sending the control packet to
another hypervisor in the cloud.
Figure 3-6 Empty or null action value 
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• PASS Value: This action tag value is inserted to the response control packet by the
destination hypervisor. The PASS value means that the traffic is an authorized traffic.
When the destination hypervisor receives the control packet, it checks the security
attributes of the destination VM with the Header of the first data packet, if access control
list allows the traffic, the destination hypervisor insert PASS value to the response control
packet. There fore, this authorized traffic can be passed to destination hypervisor. As soon
as the source hypervisor receives a response control packet with PASS value, it passes the
traffic flow to the destination hypervisor.
Figure 3-7 Pass action value 
• DROP Value: Like the previous one, this action tag value is inserted to the response
control packet by the destination hypervisor too. DROP value means that the traffic
should be dropped right on the source hypervisor. The destination hypervisor insert this
value to the response control packet when the security attributes of the destination VM do
not match with the traffic flow.
Figure 3-8 Drop action value 
3.3.4 Traffic filter 
Filtering the traffic is a major part of this security design. After generating the control 
packet by the source hypervisor, it should be sent to the destination hypervisor. In this part, the 
destination hypervisor should filter the traffic and send the response control packet back to the 
source hypervisor. 
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Filtering the traffic is done by the use of ACLs. In fact, in this security architecture, 
access control lists of each VM are located in the hypervisor where the VM is located. Thus, 
access control list is an essential part of multi-tenancy cloud environments in order to prevent 
tenants compromising virtual machines of other tenants. There are many different ways that a 
malicious VM can compromise another VM. A cloud user can perform different types of attacks 
–such as denial of service- against another user. It is good to mention that according to [49] the
existing mechanism for securing the multi-tenancy cloud environments are inherited from 
enterprises. Two of those mechanisms are: 
• VLANs
• Firewalls
The above mentioned traffic filtering mechanisms are initially designed for enterprise 
networks that have fewer requirements for flexibility and scalability and also computing 
resources in enterprise networks are shared between fewer distinct organizations. In other words, 
in an enterprise network, rarely one user tries to perform attack (for example DoS attack) to 
another user.  
Unlike enterprise networks, cloud networks have a network design that is different in the 
sense of scale. It means that the cloud networks are usually larger than enterprise networks. 
Because of this fact, for designing access control security architecture for multi-tenancy cloud 
networks we should always take the following characteristics into consideration: 
• Scalability of design
• Flexibility of policies
• Multi-tenancy nature of cloud
Although the AC policies are defined, set and stored by the destination, it’s better for the 
policies to be enforced close to the source rather than at the destination. This fact can vastly 
prevent unauthorized traffic from abusing the network. Unauthorized traffic can cause congestion 
and also DoS attacks and etc. [43] 
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The prototype of proposed architecture is based on two clear and distinct access control 
policies: 
• Pass the traffic 
• Drop the traffic 
Basically, these two actions are done on the source hypervisor. This decision is made 
based on the control packet response that source hypervisor receives from destination hypervisor. 
Beside Passing and Dropping the traffic, there are more possible actions that could be taken like 
limiting the traffic and so on, but we leave those for future work.  
3.3.5 Architecture design 
As illustrated in Figure 3-4, when the source VM sends the traffic to destination VM, the 
traffic has to pass through the hypervisor that it is located on it (we call it source hypervisor). As 
soon as the data packets reach the hypervisor, it generates a control packet. This control packet 
consists of necessary information for access control checking as well as source IP address of the 
packets, destination IP address of the packets, port number and protocol type (TCP or UDP). So 
the control packet has to be sent to destination hypervisor. Destination hypervisor checks the 
content of the control packet and decide whether the traffic can be delivered to destination 
hypervisor or not.  
If the source VM is permitted to send the so-called traffic to the destination VM, so the 
destination hypervisor adds the pass or drop value to the control packet payload and sends it back 
to the source hypervisor. According to this pass or drop values, the source hypervisor threat the 
awaiting traffic.  
Detailed design 
Our proposed architecture is all about providing network access control between the 
virtual machines in the context of multi-tenancy cloud computing. The ultimate goal of this 
architecture is to block and drop undesired packets as close as possible of source VM that in our 
case is source hypervisor.  
As you can see in Figure 3-9, the process starts when a VM initiate a traffic to send to 
another VM, as soon as traffic received by the source hypervisor, it checks the packet and looks 
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for the destination address that is located in the inserted in the IP packet header. If the destination 
address belongs to a virtual machine in the same cloud, we will have two possibilities: 
• First Case:
Destination address is located on the same physical server (hypervisor). In this case, our
security architecture has a simpler task to do. It has to only check the access control
policy of the destination VM –that is located on the same hypervisor- and it can decide
right away whether to Pass or Drop the traffic.
• Second Case:
Destination address is located on different physical server (hypervisor).
In this case, the source hypervisor generates and sends the control packet to the
destination hypervisor where the destination VM is located. Then it should wait for the
response control packet from the destination hypervisor.
Beside the so-called possibilities that we mentioned before, there may be an exception. This 
exception occurs when the destination address does not belong to any VM in this cloud. It means 
that source address and destination address belong to two devices that are not co-located in the 
same cloud. In this case, this architecture does get involve into doing any particular action. It only 
has to pass the traffic to the middle box (router, switch, firewall or…) that is default gateway of 
the source hypervisor. 
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Figure 3-9 General mechanism flowchart 
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The main part of mechanism starts if the destination address belongs to another VM that 
is located on another hypervisor (destination hypervisor). In this case, the whole traffic should 
wait until the source hypervisor generate and send a control packet to destination hypervisor. 
Hence, the decision will be made based on the response control packet.  
Destination hypervisor 
Figure 3-10 shows the main task of destination hypervisor when it receives the control 
packet from source hypervisor.  
Figure 3-10 Destination hypervisor’s task when it receives a control packet 
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In fact, destination hypervisor has to select one of the following options when it receives 
the control packet form the source hypervisor:  
• Insert pass value to the control packet if the access control policy of the
destination Virtual Machine match, and accept the traffic from source VM.
• Insert drop value to the control packet if the access control policy of the
destination VM does not match and source VM is not authorize to send the traffic
to the destination VM.
• Insert null value to the control packet of the destination address is not found in
the destination hypervisor. This may happen if control packet is sent to this
hypervisor by mistake or is destination VM is migrated to another hypervisor and
source hypervisor is not updated about the VMs that are located in the destination
hypervisor.
After performing one of the above actions and inserting proper value to the control 
packet, the destination hypervisor returns the edited control packet to the hypervisor that 
generated the control packet, which in our case is source hypervisor.    
Source Hypervisor 
The response control packet, most likely contains the decision and the action that should 
be taken for the traffic. Why most likely? Because if the source hypervisor sees the Null value in 
the control packet, it knows that destination VM is not found yet and it should regenerate the 
control packet and send it to another hypervisor. This step should be done after asking all other 
hypervisors for the update message. If the update massages are all received and the destination 
VM is not found, so the traffic should be dropped consequently (Figure 3-11).  
In the case of drop value, the source hypervisor drop the traffic right away and the traffic 
will not even exit the hypervisor. It is great, isn’t it? It means that no wasted and unnecessary 
traffic in the network, and consequently the network bandwidth do not suffer from extra and 
unwanted traffic. In the next chapter, we will try to implement the architecture and see the result.  
Finally the pass value indicates that the access control policy match between the source 
and destination and source VM and the traffic will pass to the destination hypervisor. 
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Figure 3-11 Source hypervisor’s task when it receives back a control packet response 
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Work Space 
In order to show the results of this project we will implement the prototype of this 
architecture using an open source virtualization system. Among the existing virtualization tools 
we can name Xenserver and KVM (Kernel-base Virtual Machine). But in this project we use 
Xenserver because it supports full virtualization and almost all existing operating systems.  
Beside that we use OpenStack, an open source cloud computing project to provide an 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS). OpenStack was prompted in 2012 and the technology behind it 
consists of a series of interrelated projects that control pools of processing, storage, and 
networking resources throughout a datacenter, all managed through a dashboard that gives 
administrators control while empowering its users to provision resources through a web interface.  
Sequence Diagram 
Sequence diagram (Figure 3-12) presents a dynamic view of the proposed architecture. As 
mentioned in the use case description, this system has two main phases, the first phase is the 
process of generating the control packet which is nothing but inserting the control tags into the IP 
packet and the second is the process of sending this control packet to the destination hypervisor 
and based on the response control packet, the source hypervisor decides about destiny of the 
traffic. This sequence diagram illustrates both phases along with the interaction of the four main 
elements of a cloud network, which are source VM, source Hypervisor, destination VM and 
finally destination hypervisor. In this illustration we marked the Pass Value of control packet 
response as green, which means that the traffic is permitted to forward to destination address. 
Obviously, when the source hypervisor receives the Drop Value from destination hypervisor it 
indicates unauthorized traffic and consequently the traffic has to be dropped right away.  
This process becomes somehow more complicated if the hypervisor receives the NULL 
Value from destination hypervisor. In this case the source hypervisor should regenerate the 
control packet and send it to another hypervisor till the destination VM is find or make sure that 
the destination address is either wrong or not found in the network. In all cases of NULL Value, 
the traffic should be delivered to destination VM or be dropped.  
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Figure 3-12 Process sequence diagram
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In some cases (mentioned in phase two of use case scenario), the destination address 
belongs to a VM, which is located on the same hypervisor. In this situation we can have two 
different possibilities: 
A: Source and destination VM belongs to the same tenant 
B: Source and destination VM belong to different tenants 
In any of the above cases, the source and destination hypervisor are the same. So, because 
the hypervisor can directly check the access control list of the destination VM, therefore, the 
hypervisor does not generate any control packet (Figure 3-13). Obviously it can decide about the 
destiny of the traffic by itself. In this case we don’t have the possibility of the NULL Value too.     
Figure 3-13 Source VM and destination VM on the same hypervisor 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we explained our proposed access control architecture for multi-tenancy 
cloud environments in detailed. Also we defined a scenario and based on that scenario we 
investigated the problems and requirements. In order to solve the problems and satisfy the 
requirements, we designed our security architecture, and using a set of illustrations and 
flowcharts, we explained the architecture in depth. As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, there 
are four main requirements for this security architecture such as scalability, security, control and 
performance. This security architecture is fully scalable. If the number of VMs grows, we only 
need to implement this architecture in the hypervisor of each physical server without any extra 
changes in the system. Besides that, this security architecture can maintain the security of 
information in the cloud system. This can be achieved by our security design when it controls the 
traffic that is sent from one hypervisor to another hypervisor and by enforcing the security 
policies in the hypervisor. Using this security architecture can lead us to better performance by 
avoiding unnecessary traffic and dedicating the cloud resources to necessary traffics. In the next 
chapter we will implement the prototype of our security architecture using the tools that we 
explained in this chapter. After that we can observe the results to see if the proposed architecture 
can improve the integrity and confidentiality of information in the multi-tenancy cloud 
environments. 
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CHAPTER 4 VALIDATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapter, we presented our security architecture in detailed that intends to 
meet the system requirements. Now, in this chapter we validate this work in order to guarantee 
that it certainly achieves the requirements. Early in the first section we define mathematical 
equations for validating our security architecture. Then we present the numerical results and the 
last section will be dedicated to analyzing the results.  
4.1 Mathematical equations 
In this section, we define mathematical equations to evaluate our proposed security 
architecture that we called it CloudGuard. First of all, we analyze the system throughput of our 
architecture as compared to another security architecture that we have studied in the literature 
review. While different solutions can be found in the literature we chose CloudPolice[43] to 
compare it to our security design because as explained in chapter two, it is a hypervisor-based 
access control system and like our security designed it implements access control only within the 
hypervisor. In other words, both of these security architectures (CloudPolice and CloudGuard) 
are designed to enforce the access control list in the hypervisor. Secondly, we analyze the latency 
of CloudGaurd as compared to CoudPolice.   
CloudPolice vs. CloudGuard 
A major different between CloudPolice and CloudGuard is that in our security design, the 
source hypervisor waits for control packet response from destination hypervisor and if the 
security policies of the source VM and destination VM match, then the source hypervisor passes 
the traffic toward the destination hypervisor and consequently destination hypervisor passes the 
traffic to destination VM.  
Contrary, according to CloudPolice, the source hypervisor does not wait for control packet 
response and it sends the whole traffic to destination hypervisor.  When the traffic reaches the 
destination hypervisor, then the security policies will be checked between the traffic and 
destination VM. In this case, if the traffic is authorized, then it can continue its journey to 
destination VM. But, if the traffic does not match with the security attributes of destination VM, 
the traffic will be ignored and dropped in the destination hypervisor. 
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4.1.1 Parameters 
In order to form a mathematical equation to evaluate the CloudGuard, we considered 
some parameters. These parameters are driven from the important element of a virtualized 
network system, such as link bandwidth, size of the packet and etc. So, we defined the following 
parameters to achieve our objectives:  
Table 4.1 List of parameters used in equations !!"# Number of packets transmitted from source VM to destination 
VM; 
!!"# Size of the data in each packet (bits); !!"#$ Number of traffic flows that are being transmitted from source 
VM to destination VM; !!"#$ Size of the traffic flow (bits); !"#$ The amount of time it takes for a traffic flow to be sent from 
source VM to destination VM (second); 
!"" The amount of time it takes for a control packet to be sent from 
source hypervisor to destination hypervisor and received back 
again by source hypervisor  (second); 
!" The amount of data that can be carried from one point to 
another in a given timer period in a gigabit Ethernet 
(1.073.741.824!bits per second);  
!!"# Probability of intrusion traffic 
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 Flow size: 
Calculating the size of the traffic flow is the first step in forming a mathematical equation. 
Request for Comments (RFC) is a publication of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). In 
march 2004 this publication has published the proposal RFC-3697 [50] and defines the traffic 
flow as “an sequence of packet sent from a particular source to a particular unicast, anycast, or 
multicast destination that the source desires to label as a flow”. Based on this definition we can 
formulate the flow size as: Size of flow = Size of packet ✕ Number of packets 
In the above calculation, we replaced the packet size and number of packets with the 
“sequence of the packet” that we had in the RFC-3697 definition.  
Also we considered the size of each packet equal to 128 bytes that is equal to 1024 bits. 
Besides that, we considered 1000 packets in each traffic flow and finally we assume that there are 
1000 to 10000 traffic flows that are going to pass from source VM to the destination VM. So, the 
size of the flow in our experiment would be 1024000 bits.  
Probability of intrusion traffic: 
Intrusion traffic in our case is the amount of traffic that is generated by a malicious VM and 
the target of this traffic is to penetrate vulnerabilities of destination VM. The amount of intrusion 
traffic is not predictable in a multi-tenancy cloud network. This amount may vary from zero to 
hundred percent depending on the value of the assets that are in the cloud network. 
Round trip time (RTT): 
Because the process of generating control packet is very similar to the process of 
generating control packets in CloudPolice, we assume that the RTT of control packet is the same 
as CloudPolice. In fact CloudPolice states that it adds ≈1.5ms round-trip latency [49], 
accordingly we assume the same amount of RTT for control packet in CloudGuard.  
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4.1.2 Latency 
Latency is one of the parameters that we consider in our project. Having all the 
parameters in mind now we can generate two equations for calculating the latency of our security 
architecture as well as CloudPolice. By latency, we mean the time interval between stimulation 
and response. In fact we want to measure which security architecture is able to transmit the data 
with less delay and overhead. 
CloudGuard: 
In our system, stimulation is generating the control packet by source hypervisor and the 
response is receiving the control packet response back by the source hypervisor. The control 
packet response is generated by the destination hypervisor. When we wanted to explain the RTT 
parameter (section 4.1.1), we mentioned ≈1.5ms round-trip latency for control packet and we 
assumed that the RTT for control packet in our security architecture is the same as CloudPolice. 
Therefore, by knowing the control packet RTT delay, we want to calculate the delay time for 
sending certain amount of packet from source VM to the destination VM.  
Looking back again into Figure 3-12 Process sequence diagram, we see that no matter what 
kind of traffic (authorized or not-authorized) is passing through the hypervisor, CluodGuard 
generates the control packet. When one VM wants to communicate with another VM in the same 
cloud environment, the source VM first sends the traffic to the source hypervisor. Then the 
source hypervisor checks the destination address and find out the destination hypervisor on which 
the destination VM is hosted on. In the next step, the source hypervisor generates a control packet 
and send this control packet to the destination hypervisor. The source hypervisor keeps the traffic 
and do not let the traffic to be passed to the destination hypervisor unless it receives back the 
control packet response from the destination hypervisor. The responsibility of the destination 
hypervisor in this stage is to check the security attributes of the traffic with the security policies 
of the destination VM. If the traffic is authorized, the control packet response sends specific 
signal to the source hypervisor and tells it to pass the traffic.  
Therefore, for every single traffic flow, CloudGuard generates one control packet. Based 
on this fact, to find out average latency of CloudGuard we just need to multiply the number of 
traffic flow to the round trip time which is ≈1.5ms. To derive an equation for our evaluation, first 
we add RTT and the time it takes to transmit one traffic flow. Then we multiply it by probability 
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of intrusion. After all we should add this value to the round trip time of the control packet for 
intrusion traffic. Finally, we repeat this process for each traffic flow in order to have the average 
latency of CloudGuard security architecture.  
!!"#$%! "#$%&#!!"#$%&' = [(!"" + !!!"#$!!" !) ∗ 1− !!"# + !"" ∗ !!"# ] ∗ !!"#$  (4.1) 
Where: 0!≤ !!!"# ≤ 1; !"" ≈ 1.5!"; !!!"#$=  (!!"# ∗ !!!"#). 
It is obvious that presence or lack of intrusion traffic does not change the mechanism of 
this security architecture and CloudGuard generates the control packet in any conditions. 
Equation 4.1 is based on the number of traffic flows. Because for each traffic flow we have a 
control packet and the round trip time for that control packet is not all, in fact, based on the size 
of traffic flow, it takes certain amount of time to transmit the traffic flow from source to 
destination.  That is why we have (!"" + !!!"#$!!" !) in the first part of our equation. 
Then, the amount of time that we calculated in the first part of the equation should be 
multiplied by the probability of intrusion traffic! 1− !!"#  because certain percentage of traffic 
flow is unwanted and intrusion traffic. 
Now we have the time that we calculated in the previous part, this time should be added to 
the round trip time that intrusion traffic impose to the system !"" ∗ !!"# .!The fact is that, the 
intrusion traffic is not being sent to the destination but there will be a little delay only for the 
control packet which is being sent from source hypervisor to the destination hypervisor. 
Finally, the whole process needs to be multiplied by the number of traffic flow because 
for each traffic flow we have a control packet.  
As explained before, the probability of intrusion traffic is always between zero and one. 
Also, based on CloudPolice, we suppose that RTT is ≈ 1.5!". 
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CloudPolice: 
At the beginning we look back again into mechanism of CloudPolice and according to 
that mechanism we define an equation for this security architecture. When a VM wants to 
communicate with another VM in the same cloud environment, the source VM sends the traffic 
to the source hypervisor. The source hypervisor checks the destination VM address and pass the 
traffic to the proper destination hypervisor on which the destination VM is hosted. Then the 
destination hypervisor check the security attribute of the traffic with the security policies of the 
destination VM. If the traffic is not authorized, the destination hypervisor generates a control 
packet and sends this control packet to the source hypervisor to tell the source hypervisor to 
block the next stream of the same traffic or to limit the bandwidth of the network that is allocated 
to this traffic.  
Therefore, CloudPolice generates control packet only for traffic flows that are intrusion. 
So, the number of control packets that are generated by CloudPolice is depended on the 
percentage of intrusion traffic. Thus, for calculating the total latency of CloudPolice we only 
need to multiply the number of intrusion traffic by the RTT. Then we need to calculate the time 
that takes for intrusion traffic to pass to the network because this amount of intrusion traffic can 
technically consume the available bandwidth of the network.  
Based on the above explanation, for calculating average latency of CloudPolice first we 
calculate the round trip time of all control packets (because CloudPolice generates the control 
packet only for intrusion traffic) and then we add this to the time that it takes to pass the intrusion 
traffic from source to the destination.  
!!!!"#$%&! "#$%&#!!"#$%&' = [ !"" ∗ !!!"# + !!!!"#!!" ! 1− !!"# ] ∗ !!"#$                      (4.2) 
Where: 0!≤ !!!"# ≤ 1; RTT≈ 1.5!"; !!!"#$=  (!!"# ∗ !!!"#). 
As you can see in the equation, the probability of intrusion traffic plays a great role in the 
result of the equation because CloudPolice generates the control packet only for intrusion traffic.  
This equation is also based on the number of traffic flows. Therefore, we should multiply 
the round trip time of the control packets by the probability of intrusion traffic !"" ∗ !!!"#  in 
order to have the delay of intrusion traffics. 
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Then, this delay time needs to be added by the time that it takes to pass the traffic flow 
from source VM to the destination VM.  And as you see in the equation 4.2, we multiplied it with 
the intrusion traffic !!!"#$!!" ! 1− !!"# .! 
Finally, we repeat this calculation for each traffic flow in order to calculate the average 
delay of CloudPolice.  
Like the equation 4.1, the probability of intrusion traffic is always between zero and one. 
Also, based on CloudPolice, we suppose that RTT is ≈ 1.5!". 
4.1.3 System throughput 
System throughput is another item that we are going to take into considerations in order to 
evaluate our security architecture. We defined two equations, one equation for CloudPolice and 
another equation for CloudGuard. 
CloudGuard: 
First we derive an equation for calculating system throughput of CloudGuard. Figure 3-12 
Process sequence diagram can help us to derive an equation. As explained before, CloudGuard 
generates a control packet for every traffic flow before passing the traffic to the destination 
hypervisor. The traffic remains in the source hypervisor until the source hypervisor received back 
the control packet response. So, unlike CloudPolice, only authorized traffic can pass through the 
network if CloudGuard is used in a multi-tenancy cloud system.  
For calculating the system throughput of CloudGuard we need to divide number of traffic 
flow by the average latency of the CloudGuard. Then we multiply that with the intrusion traffic. 
!!"#$%!!"#$%&!!ℎ!"#$ℎ!"# = ! (!!"#$∗! !"#$)!"#$%&'!!!"#$%! ! 1− !!"# ! (4.3)  
Where: 0!≤ !!!"# ≤ 1; !"" ≈ 1.5!"; !!!"#$=  (!!"# ∗ !!!"#). 
Unlike equation 4.1 and 4.2, this equation is based on probability of intrusion traffic. All 
we did in this equation is to divide the total size of traffic flow by the average latency that we 
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calculated in equation 4.1. The reason for this calculation (
(!!"#$∗! !"#$)!"!"#$%!!!"#$%!) is to find out the 
amount of traffic flow that we can pass from source VM to the destination VM in a certain time. 
Finally we multiply the first part of equation 4.3 by the probability of intrusion traffic.  
CloudPolice: 
If we look deeper into this security architecture, we can see that it does not send any 
control packet before passing the traffic packets to the destination hypervisor. In other words, 
CloudPolice pass all traffics from source hypervisor to destination hypervisor, and it is the 
destination hypervisor that decide about the destiny of the traffic.  
Unlike our security architecture, CloudPolice let all traffic flows to pass from one 
hypervisor to another hypervisor that includes unwanted and unauthorized traffic. Based on this 
fact, when we want to calculate the system throughput of CloudPolice we should deduct the 
amount of unauthorized traffic. The reason for this deduction is that the unauthorized traffic that 
is generated by an intruder can occupy the usable bandwidth of network.  
So, like equation (3), we need to divide number of traffic flow by the average latency of 
the CloudPolice. Then we multiply that with the intrusion traffic. This equation is for the 
situation in which the probability of intrusion traffic is between zero percent up to fifty percent, 
but because of the nature of CloudPolice we should consider the system throughput of 
CloudPolice equal to zero if the probability of intrusion is between fifty percent up to hundred 
percent.  
!!"#$%&!!"#$%&!!ℎ!"#$ℎ!"# = ! (!!"#$∗! !"#$)!"#$%&'!!!"#$%& ! 1− 2!!"#  , If        0!≤ !!!"# ≤ 0.5!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.4)                             
OR !!"#$%&!!"#$%&!!ℎ!"#$ℎ!"# = !0 , If     0. 5! ≤ !!!"# ≤ 1! 
As you see, the equation for calculating the system throughput of CloudPolice has a 
conditional situation. This condition depends on amount of intrusion traffic. In other words, if the 
probability of intrusion traffic is between zero and fifty percent, we can calculate the system 
throughput of CloudGuard and CloudGuard is the same way and with only a slight change for 
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adjusting the probability of intrusion. But if the probability of intrusion is more that fifty percent, 
the system throughput of CloudPolice will be equal to zero.  
4.2 Numerical results 
In this section we are going to we give value to variables of equations and take some 
numerical results from the equations. !!"# is a variable that we give different values to that to run 
our test. The values that we give to !!"#!are just random numbers chosen from 0 and 1 (0% to 
100%). The other variable is the number of traffic flows that we choose again random numbers 
from 1000 to 10000. The reason for choosing those numbers is to verify how our security 
architecture performs in different situations. Then we will analyze the results.  
4.2.1 Latency 
Latency or in cloud computing system is an important element that can indicate the 
effectiveness of a security system. Before getting into the tests and results, we should mention a 
vital point about all security system. That important point is that, every single security point 
imposes some delay and latency to the whole system. Not only in the computing systems, but 
also in the not computing systems we have the same fact. For example, in an airport if we want to 
increase the level of security of the passenger we need to place a security gate and force people to 
pass through this security gate. The guardians need to spend few minutes for investigating all 
people entering the airport. Everybody agree that the delay due to security check in the airport is 
absolutely logic and acceptable. We can generalize that fact to our security architecture. And we 
can summarize that the delay of our security system has an acceptable logic.  
To evaluate the latency of our security architecture we perform nine different tests as 
illustrated in Table 4.2. In the first test, 10 percent of all traffics are intrusion. In the second test, 
20 percent of the traffics are intrusion and we continue this strategy till test number nine in which 
90 percent of traffics are intrusion. In all tests, we have a fix round trip time ≈1.5ms, which is the 
RTT, proved by CloudPolice.  Again we emphasize that; we want to calculate the delay time for 
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sending certain amount of packet from source VM to the destination VM. In fact we want to 
measure which security architecture as able to transmit the data with less delay and less overhead. 
Table 4.2 Latency variables and values. 
Test Number P-Intrusion 
1 0.1 
2 0.2 
3 0.3 
4 0.4 
5 0.5 
6 0.6 
7 0.7 
8 0.8 
9 0.9 
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Figure 4-1 Test number 1 (P-int = 0.1) 
Test number 1 
Test number one takes place in a cloud environment in which 10 percent of its traffic is 
unauthorized and intrusion. In comparison with CloudPolice, our security architecture has more 
latency and overhead on the system. When we start the test by 1000 traffic flows, the latency that 
CloudGuard is more than CloudPolice but it is very close to that. Then the delay becomes more 
when the numbers of traffic flows grow. We explained in the previous chapter that, CloudPolice 
generates the control packet only if there is any intrusion traffic in the system. That is why the 
latency of CloudPolice is close to CloudGuard when there is small amount of intrusion traffic in 
the system.  
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Figure 4-2 Test number 2 (P-int = 0.2) 
Test number 2 
For the test number two we assigned the P-int variable to 0.2. This value means that 20 
percent of the traffic that is in the cloud environment is intrusion and the rest of traffic flows are 
healthy traffic. In contrast with the test number one, we see that the difference between average 
latency of CloudGuard and CloudPolice is getting closer. The more is the probability of intrusion 
traffic in the system, the lower become the latency of CloudGuard. In the next test we will 
increase the probability of intrusion traffic and we will investigate the results. 
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Figure 4-3 Test number 3 (P-int = 0.3) 
Test number 3 
For the test number 3, we set the probability of intrusion traffic to 0.3. In this test we 
assume that 30 percent of the traffic on the cloud system is malicious and intrusion traffic. Figure 
4-3 reveals that latency of CloudGuard is getting much better than the latency of CloudPolice 
when the probability of intrusion traffic is getting higher in a multi-tenancy cloud environment.   
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Figure 4-4 Test number 4 (P-int = 0.4) 
Test number 4 
For the test number 4, we set the probability of intrusion traffic to 0.4. In this test we 
assume that 40 percent of the traffic on the cloud system is malicious and intrusion traffic and 
still we observe that the average latency of CloudPolice is less than the average latency of 
CloudGuard.  So, in this test the performance of CloudGuard is getting closer to the performance 
of CloudPolice in the context of average latency. 
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Figure 4-5 Test number 5 (P-int = 0.5) 
Test number 5 
We continue our experiments and reach to the test number five. We gave the value of 0.5 to 
P-int. In this test we assume that 50 percent of the traffic on the cloud system is malicious and 
intrusion traffic. Figure 4-5 indicates that the average latency of CloudGuard is still more than the 
average latency of CloudPolice but the difference between average latency of CloudGuard and 
CloudPolice is decreasing.  
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Figure 4-6 Test number 6 (P-int = 0.6) 
Test number 6 
The probability of intrusion traffic for the test number six is sixty percent. As illustrated in 
the result of the test number 6, if we compare the average latency we can see that our security 
architecture impose only a little bit of overhead on the system in contrast to that of CloudPolice. 
It is important to mention that, the more we increase the probability of intrusion; the average 
latency that CloudPolice imposes to the system is getting more.  
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Figure 4-7 Test number 7 (P-int = 0.7) 
 
Test number 7 
The test number 7 is the completion of previous tests. The goal of this test is again to 
increase the probability of intrusion traffic to seventy percent. Although CloudPolice is 
generating control packet for seventy percent of traffic flow but the average latency of this 
security architecture is getting very close to the average latency of CloudGuard. Figure 4-6 
reveals that latency of CloudGuard is getting much better than the latency of CloudPolice when 
the probability of intrusion traffic is getting higher in a multi-tenancy cloud environment.   
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Figure 4-8 Test number 8 (P-int = 0.8) 
Test number 8 
We continue our experiments with the test number 8 and assign the value of 0.8 to the P-int 
variable. The goal of this test is again to increase the probability of intrusion traffic to eighty 
percent. Although CloudPolice is generating control packet for eighty five percent of traffic flow 
but the latency of this security architecture is way more than the average latency of CloudGuard. 
Figure 4-6 reveals that latency of CloudGuard is getting much better than the latency of 
CloudPolice when the probability of intrusion traffic is getting higher in a multi-tenancy cloud 
environment.   
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Figure 4-9 Test number 9 (P-int = 0.9) 
Test number 9 
This test is the last one for evaluating the latency. We increased the value of probability of 
intrusion traffic to 90 percent (0.9). We observed that the average latency of CloudPolice and 
CloudGuard are almost the same. This test reveals that latency of CloudGuard is almost the same 
as the latency of CloudPolice when the probability of intrusion traffic is getting higher in a multi-
tenancy cloud environment.   
The above tests show that CloudGuard imposes a little bit of overhead in the system. This 
latency is less than a millisecond. Thus, in a high-risk cloud environment that number of 
intrusion traffic is high, the latency of CloudGuard is very close to the latency of CloudPolice.  
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4.2.2 System throughput 
To illustrate the system throughput of our security architecture we perform only 1 test. In 
this test the number of traffic flow (!!"#$) is fix and equal to 1000. But for the other variable that 
is probability of intrusion traffic (!!"#) we start our test from 0 percent of intrusion traffic to 100 
percent of intrusion traffic.  
Figure 4-10 Test number 10 for evaluating system throughput 
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As illustrated in the Figure 4-10, we start the test from probability of intrusion of 0, the 
system throughput of CloudPolice is better, but when reach to the point that probability of 
intrusion is about thirty percent (0.3215) both CloudPolice and CloudGuard has the same 
throughput and we continue to the end of the test, our security architecture show better system 
throughput. Important point in this test is that after 50 percent of intrusion traffic, CloudPolice is 
paralyzed and has not system throughput.  
 Result of the pervious test indicates that CloudGuard has better system throughput than 
CloudPolice in high-risk multi-tenancy cloud computing environments. Therefore, we can 
conclude that CloudGuard is effective security architecture and is suitable for high-risk 
environments. High-risk multi-tenancy cloud computing environment is a cloud environment in 
which, the system is target of many attacks and there are lots of intrusion and unwanted traffic 
being sent to VMs. CloudGuard has obviously better system throughput in the critical multi-
tenancy cloud network environments. The results show that our security architecture is more 
effective when the amount of intrusion traffic is higher in the cloud system. Financial institutions 
and game centers are examples of network that are always target of attackers and malicious 
agents. At the same time, we can hardly imagine a network environment with zero percent of 
attacks.   
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation we have proposed an architecture that controls the access of network 
entities in a multi-tenancy cloud environment. This architecture implements a hypervisor-based 
access control mechanism and allows only legitimate and authorized traffic to pass to the cloud 
network environment.  
This last chapter presents a summary of the work that has been exposed in this project. 
Later on, future works to overcome the limitation of the current proposal are described. 
5.1 Summary of the work 
We propose CloudGuard, a system that implements a hypervisor-based access control 
mechanism.  Based on the concept of security-in-depth, CloudGuard adds another layer of 
security to multi-tenancy cloud computing environments and prevents unauthorized and illegal 
access to the cloud resources. This security architecture can be simply implemented to hypervisor 
and provide scalable and more robust access control than existing network-based techniques. 
When the source VM sends the traffic to destination VM, the traffic has to pass through 
the hypervisor that it hosting source VM. This source hypervisor recognizes the destination IP 
address of the traffic and sends the traffic to the destination VM. If the destination VM is located 
on the same hypervisor, the traffic will be simply delivered to the destination. But if the 
destination VM is located on another hypervisor, then, it generates a control packet. This control 
packet consists of necessary information for access control checking as well as source IP address 
of the packets, destination IP address of the packets, port number and protocol type (TCP or 
UDP). So the control packet has to be sent to destination hypervisor. Destination hypervisor 
checks the content of the control packet and decide whether the traffic can be delivered to 
destination hypervisor or not.  
If the source VM is permitted to send the so-called traffic to the destination VM, so the 
destination hypervisor adds the pass value to the control packet payload and sends it back to the 
source hypervisor. But if the source VM is not permitted to send that traffic to the destination 
VM, then the destination hypervisor adds the drop value to the control packet payload and sends 
it back to the source hypervisor. Based on the pass or drop values, the source hypervisor threat 
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the awaiting traffic. This access control architecture allows us to keep the bandwidth of the 
network in a healthy level.  
We further built a mathematical model in order to evaluate the performance of our security 
architecture. Using that mathematical model, we conducted few tests to evaluate the system 
throughput and the latency of our security architecture.  
Although our security architecture impose small amount of delay (less than one 
millisecond) to the system, but the results show that the system throughput of our access control 
security architecture is better in high-risk environments where the number of intrusion traffic is 
high. The more the amount of intrusion traffic is, the better the system throughput of our security 
architecture becomes in contrast with CloudPolice. For example, when the probability of 
intrusion traffic reaches 32 percent of whole traffic, CloudPolice becomes almost paralyzed but 
our security architecture can still pass the authorized traffic from source VM to the destination 
VM.     
5.2 Limitations As# illustrated# in# the# previous# chapter,# we# evaluated# our# security# architecture# by# using#mathematical#modeling.##The#test#bed#of#this#evaluation#is#included#a#set#of#virtual#machines#that#are#located#in#the#hypervisors.#This#virtualized#environment#causes#limited#scope#of#the#experiments#we#could# preform.# For# example,# we# were# not# able# to# evaluate# the# latency# and# throughput# of# our#security# architecture# when# traffic# is# being# sent# between# a# non>VM# nod# and# a# virtual# machine.#However,# this# limitation# in# our# evaluation# has# no# bearing# on# how# our# security# architecture# can#reduce#unwanted#and#unauthorized#traffic#in#multi>tenancy#cloud#computing#environments.##
5.3 Future works 
Future work should focus on the intra-cloud traffic. In a real world cloud environment, the 
traffic may pass through lots of middle devices such as switches, routers and firewalls. So, when 
a VM wants to send traffic to another VM that is located in another cloud, we need more 
complex access control update between hypervisors that are located in different cloud. Hence, in 
the context of intra-cloud traffic, the process of propagation of the security attributes and updates 
between hypervisors should be taken into considerations. An example of security update is when 
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one virtual machine migrates from one hypervisor to another hypervisor, so other hypervisors 
should be updated about this change in with acceptable delay.  
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